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Mino 3
INTRODUCTION: EDUCATING ON THE PAST

“Until the lion has his own historian, the hunter will always be a hero.”
- Ewe proverb (West Africa)

This piece of wisdom vividly captures the inherent bias in every retelling of the past. And
yet, people know themselves from their history. Because of this, History1 curricula are often
controversial. Students in India and Pakistan learn about the history of partition from opposing
perspectives: each country’s national narrative vilifies the other, fanning the flames of mutual
hatred. 2 In late nineteenth century America, government-operated Indian boarding schools
sought to erase students’ ethnic identities by teaching them a Eurocentric version of U.S. history
that ignored the contributions of Native Americans. These are far from unique problems.
Developing an inclusive national narrative poses real challenges to people throughout the world
as identity groups struggle to control the interpretations of the past taught to younger generations.
One forum for this struggle is the national History curriculum, through which the state provides
its own account of the national narrative.
Teaching a national History through the nationalized education system promotes the
formation of national identity among the population. In sub-Saharan African countries, the rapid
expansion of nationalized education facilitates the creation of national identities where they
previously did not exist and cultivates citizens’ identification with the nation over subnational
and supranational social groups. The augmentation of national identity has significant
1

Throughout this thesis, “history” refers to the study of past events, while “History” refers to the subject taught in
schools.
2
Jon Dorschner and Thomas Sherlock, “The Role of History Textbooks in Shaping Collective Identities in India and
Pakistan,” in Teaching the Violent Past, ed. Elizabeth A. Cole (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007): 275316.
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implications at the domestic and international level. First, people identify more closely with
other members of their nation and less exclusively with other members of their ethnic group.
Second, as people develop a greater identification with other nationals, they identify less with
nonnationals. Shifts in identity alter people’s political behavior toward other nationals and
nonnationals. As more people identify with and integrate into the nation, they regard each other
as members of the same community and build more peaceful relations with each other. But
integration within the nation also polarizes the nation against other nations, risking international
conflict. The main methodology employed here to explore the impact of History education on
identity formation is a case study of education in Uganda.
Like other low-income countries, Uganda has received significant amounts of aid from
foreign donors for education. International donors and governments worldwide hurriedly expend
their efforts to realize the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and
Education for All (EFA) by 2015. Sub-Saharan African countries, in particular, have benefited
from the surge in foreign aid for education during the past thirty years. In 2007, sub-Saharan
Africa received the most Official Development Assistance to education out of all regions of the
world.3 The World Bank’s International Development Association directs half its share of credits
and loans to Africa. 4 Governments in low-income countries have generally used the aid to
construct infrastructure to accommodate more pupils. As a result of these target-driven initiatives,
primary and secondary education has expanded swiftly throughout the world: now, according to
UNICEF, 84 percent of primary-school-age children across the world are enrolled in schools.5
3

UNESCO, Education For All Global Monitoring Report 2010 (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2010),
444-445.
4
World Bank, “What is IDA?”
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/IDA/0,,contentMDK:21206704~menuPK:83991
~pagePK:51236175~piPK:437394~theSitePK:73154,00.html. The IDA lends money without an interest charge and
requires repayments over a period of 35 to 40 years.
5
UNICEF, The State of the World’s Children Special Edition, (New York: UNICEF, 2009), ii.
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Aiming toward achieving EFA (see Appendix A for EFA goals), international organizations have
invested considerable resources into research on increasing access to quality basic education.
The MDGs and EFA assume the positive impacts of education. This faith in a generalized
notion of education is at times taken to absurd and simplistic lengths. The United Nations
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) asserts that education plays an
essential role in addressing all eight MDGs: education reduces poverty, combats child mortality,
improves maternal health, fights diseases, ensures environmental sustainability, and even creates
global partnerships for development.6 A major recipient of international assistance, Uganda’s
Ministry of Education and Sports also embraces the MDGs and EFA goals as its own national
objectives.7 Overall, both international actors and the Ugandan government pour their efforts into
increasing school enrollment rates. But a blind acceptance of education as a panacea can be
problematic.
International donors typically overlook the content of recipient countries’ History
curricula. Despite the vast literature on the expansion of schooling in Africa, information about
the historical knowledge taught to African students is sparse. As mass schooling expands to
every corner of the world, it is crucial to evaluate the effect of teaching a state-sponsored History
on intranational and international relations through case studies of various countries. Although
findings from the Uganda case study cannot be generalized to the entire continent, they can
inform further research on History teaching in sub-Saharan Africa. Sub-Saharan African
countries like Uganda provide a unique context for studying nationalized education for three
primary reasons.
6

UNESCO, “Education and the Millennium Development Goals,” http://www.unesco.org/en/education-for-allinternational-coordination/themes/education-and-the-mdgs/.
7
Uganda Ministry of Education and Sports, “Education Sector Strategic Plan: 2004-2015,”
http://chet.org.za/manual/media/files/chet_hernana_docs/Uganda/National/Education%20Sector%20Strategic%20Pl
an%202004-2015.pdf , 2.
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First, colonial powers initially created both the state and the nation in sub-Saharan Africa.
During the infamous “Scramble for Africa”, European countries carved up Africa in a fierce
competition for global influence. While striving to ensure their access to the continent’s wealth
of resources, they severed ethnic groups and grouped different ethnicities together into colonies.
European powers then built colonial governments to serve their interests over those of the
colonized and to control the indigenous people. Thus, sub-Saharan African states originally
functioned as an extension of the colonizing state’s rule. After they gained independence, the
international community automatically recognized the sovereignty of these same governments
under new African leaders. Colonial boundaries define the African nations of today. Over fifty
different ethnic groups compose the contemporary Ugandan nation. Thus, the indigenous people
of sub-Saharan Africa participated in the initial formation of neither state nor national identity.
The sub-Saharan African state use nationalized History education to socialize its citizens to
adopt national identity even though there is little historical basis for a national community.
Second, Europeans imported their own form of education to Africa. During the
precolonial and colonial periods, Christian and Catholic missionaries introduced European
schooling as a part of their evangelizing efforts. Colonial regimes supported the missionaries’
endeavors and built their own schools for the indigenous people.8 Thus, the objectives of the
colonial regime and missionary groups drove the expansion of colonial educational systems. Yet,
the educational systems inherited from colonial powers have remained virtually the same since
independence. The Ugandan nationalized education system, for example, mirrors the British
education system. The missionary groups, who established the first European-style schools in
Uganda, remain influential in the country’s nationalized education system. Teacher colleges in

8

Jim N. Omatseye and Bridget O. Omatseye, Going to School in Sub-Saharan Africa (Westport, CT: Greenwood
Press, 2008), 186.
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Uganda train Ugandan teachers to employ European methods of instruction. Nevertheless, subSaharan African states promote this form of education over indigenous forms of education in
their EFA campaign.
Third, sub-Saharan African states expanded mass education recently and rapidly.
According to UNICEF, mass schooling has had the least penetration in Africa compared to the
rest of the world: only 64 percent of the continent’s primary-age school children attend school.9
The median survival rate to the last grade of education, according to UNESCO, was lower for
sub-Saharan Africa than for any other region in 2005. The region had a survival rate of 67
percent, while Uganda had an even lower survival rate of 31 percent.10 On the other hand, subSaharan Africa also experienced the world’s highest recent increase in total primary school
enrollment rate: enrollment rose by 42 percent from 1996 to 2002. 11 In Uganda, the ratio of
primary school-age population attending school nearly doubled from 1997 to 2009.
Because the expansion of nationalized education happened so quickly in Uganda, there is
an enormous intergenerational gap in the level of schooling obtained. In addition, there are
interethnic disparities in the penetration of mass education. The Karimojong people of
northeastern Uganda have for long resisted international and national efforts to introduce mass
education, whereas the Buganda people of central Uganda are the most school-educated ethnic
group in Uganda. Since Uganda’s national History curriculum has not significantly changed
since independence, the most important independent variable is the change in access to education.
The considerable intergenerational and interregional differences in exposure to schooling enable
a comparison of the identities of school-educated and non-school educated Ugandans.

9

UNICEF, “Children out of School,” http://www.childinfo.org/education_outofschool.php.
UNESCO, “Regional Overview: Sub-Saharan Africa,” in Education For All Global Monitoring Report 2009,
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0017/001784/178418e.pdf, 4.
11
Ibid., 2.

10
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Qualitative information, collected from interviews with Ugandans of different ethnicities and of
different educational backgrounds, and quantitative information from countrywide surveys can
help determine the impact of History education on identity across generations and ethnic groups.
The first two chapters of this paper establish the theoretical foundations on which to build
the Uganda case study. An interdisciplinary theoretical overview, informed by empirical
evidence from a diverse array of countries, validates two premises: First, people’s ethnic,
national, regional, and global identities influence their political behavior. Second, History
teaching contributes to the formation of these identities. The third chapter introduces the Uganda
case study with the history of education in Uganda. It follows trends in education during the
precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial periods and illustrates how different actors employed
education to manipulate identity. The fourth chapter completes the case study by explaining how
History education promotes both national and regional identity, beginning with an overview of
the national History curricula of primary and secondary schools. The Ugandan case confirms that
nationalized History education contributes to changing the way people perceive themselves and
the nation. The addition of national identity to Ugandans’ self-conceptions has led to the
development of more peaceful interethnic relations in the country while lowering the status of
non-school educated populations. The paper concludes with a summary of the case study’s key
findings, situates itself within existing literature, identifies its limitations, and provides
suggestions for further research. Finally, it offers the case study’s implications for the provision
of foreign aid for education, the revision of Uganda’s History curriculum, and the reform of all
countries’ History curricula.
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CHAPTER I: IDENTITYAND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR
People’s identities influence their political behavior, or behavior toward others, because
how an individual sees himself in relation to others affects the way he interacts with them. This
chapter first defines identity and explains the link between identity and behavior. It then
elaborates upon the nature of identity framed at the ethnic, national, regional, and global levels.
The chapter concludes that despite their different levels of inclusiveness, these collective
identities share some similarities. When triggered, each of these identities guide people to engage
in actions that reflect the values and expectations associated with the identity. Most notably, each
identity assumes a common past. Since a shared group narrative is the essential foundation of
collective identity, History education plays a particularly important role in communicating that
narrative to younger generations and fostering the development of those identities.
Identity: Conditional, Relational, and Directive

Do I contradict myself?
Very well then I contradict myself.
(I am large, I contain multitudes.)
~Walt Whitman, Leaves of Grass

Identity is an individual’s conception of the self. It is the response to the question: “Who
am I?” The answer to the question is complicated. Every individual “contain[s] multitudes” of
different identities. Just as Whitman discovers contradictions within himself, some of these
identities may conflict with each other. This is because every identity is fundamentally linked to
a social group, which ties together people with a certain set of values and norms. Social groups
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vary in their level of cohesion. Some social groups, such as the Chicago Cubs, have institutions
that coordinate the collective actions of the group and set requirements for entry into the group.
Other social groups do not have organizations that bring together all members of the social group.
Many individuals identify as Chicago Cubs fans, but few belong to an organization based upon
the identity of Cubbie devotee. Nonetheless, even if the social group lacks organization,
members of the group are bound together by the values, beliefs, and ideals associated with the
group identity. Thus, having an identity means being part of a social group. Each individual has a
unique set of identities, but each of these identities is shared with others who are members of the
social groups attached to the identities. Both the individual and the social group contribute to
forging the group’s identity. Because identities are intrinsically linked to social groups that
include some but excludes others, group identity influences social interactions. Three qualities
demonstrate the significance of identity to interpersonal relations: Identity is conditional,
relational, and directive.
First, identity is conditional. Individuals have constantly fluctuating identities from which
they derive their self-conception. The definition of each identity can change over time. For
example, the meaning of female identity may gradually shift as an individual attempts to
navigate through the different definitions of womanhood offered by society. People discard some
identities as they develop new identifications with different social groups. Take, for example, an
adult who no longer identifies as an adolescent. At times, some identities become more salient
than other identities. For instance, one can simultaneously self-identify as a student, a woman,
and an Asian-American, but each of these identities vary in the degree of importance to the
individual both across time and in different contexts.
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One’s self-conception can also vacillate in different circumstances. While collective
identity, or the general idea of a group’s identity, is relatively durable and persistent, individual
identity can be situational and based upon context.12 For example, the definition of Frenchness
may be fairly stable overall among the French population, but the relevance and the meaning of
being French to one individual partly hinges on his circumstances. The saliency of one identity at
a certain point in time depends upon the elicitation of identities by the sociopolitical context and
the individual’s own activation of the identity. The specific context in question does not
necessarily dictate the relevance of an identity, but situational factors can have a powerful
influence upon how one perceives oneself. One Ugandan explains the importance of
circumstance to her identity: “When I am in Uganda, my Acholi (ethnic) identity is most
important. When I am outside of Uganda, being a Ugandan is most important.”13 This shift in the
relevance of identity is an example of short-term identity salience. The social context highly
influences short-term identity salience, but long-term identity salience develops over time. Over
a longer span of time, an identity’s strength is fairly stable throughout different contexts. If one
has a weak long-term social identity, then that identity is unlikely to come to the fore when
making decisions about how to act. That identity is generally irrelevant in comparison to others
throughout different scenarios.
Second, identity is relational. Defining oneself and others requires comparison. 14
Distinguishing between members and non-members of the group necessitates drawing
boundaries between the in-group and the out-group. Thus, identity simultaneously unifies and
divides since it includes some while excluding others. Social groups differentiate themselves

12

Anthony D. Smith, “National Identity and the Idea of European Unity.” International Affairs 68, no. 1(1992): 59.
Acholi woman, telephone interview by author, January 8, 2011.
14
H. Tajfel and J. C.Turner, “The social identity theory of intergroup behavior,” in Psychology of Intergroup
Relations, eds. S. Worchel and W. G. Austin, 2nd ed. (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1985), 7-24.
13
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from others by emphasizing their distinctive characteristics. Groups desire a positive evaluation
of their group by comparison, and the relational aspect of identity explains why group identity
guides people’s behavior towards the in-group and the out-group.
Third, identity is directive; it guides behavior. Developed mainly by social psychologists
Henri Tajfel and John Turner, social identity theory has laid a framework for understanding the
relationship between identity and behavior. 15 Theorists in psychology define identity as a
cognitive schema which serves as a framework for understanding one’s experiences.16 Identity
helps people recognize their position in their environment, and each identity carries a set of
expectations for behavior. The salience of an identity determines an individual’s receptiveness to
cues for behavior linked to that identity.17 Thus, the more important the identity to an individual,
the more likely she will choose to act in a way that aligns with the expectations attached to that
identity. For example, a religious Muslim woman will wear a burqa, while a religious Christian
will wear a cross. Even if they live in the same nation, each will see the other across a religious
chasm because of these distinctive behaviors dictated by their different beliefs and identities.
Less religious Muslim or Christian women, however, may not be identifiable from their
appearance and may be more likely to see their shared identity as women and as fellow nationals.
Numerous case studies suggest that this theory of identity salience and its link to behavior is
accurate.18 If an individual strongly identifies with a social group and perceives herself as an

15

Ibid.
Hazel Markus, “Self-Schemata and Processing of Information About the Self,” Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology 35, no. 2 (1977): 63-78.
17
Sheldon Stryker, Symbolic interactionism: A social structural version (Menlo Park, CA: Benjamin Cumming,
1980).
18
Several studies demonstrate that the salience of identity predicts time spent in activities attached to identity. The
following are a few examples. Examples include studies in religious identity and religious activities and blood donor
identity and blood donations: Sheldon Stryker and Richard T. Serpe, “Commitment, Identity Salience, and Role
Behavior: A Theory and Research Example,” in Personality, Roles, and Social Behavior, eds. W. Ickes and E.
Knowles (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1982), 199-218.; Peter L. Callero, “Role-Identity Salience,” Social
Psychology Quarterly 48 (1985): 203-14.

16
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integral part of the larger group rather than as a separate entity, she appropriates the triumphs and
the trials of the group as her own.19 Thus, she will act to help the group as she would help herself.
Therefore, identity guides an individual’s behavior as a member of the social group.
Since identity is relational, conditional, and directive, circumstances that heighten
intergroup differences can trigger a certain identity, which in turn guides behavior. Tajfel found
that even randomly formed groups strive to acquire a positive social identity through competition
with other groups.20 In particular, perceived threats to the group’s identity increase the saliency
of the identity to the in-group. A threat implies that the group can potentially lose comparative
status. In response, group members act to secure and elevate their group’s position. Helping the
in-group and hurting the out-group are essentially the same when groups believe that they are in
a zero-sum competition for status. For example, when people of the same ethnicity feel that they
are disproportionally affected by difficult conditions, they scapegoat other groups for their
collective problems. 21 The in-group begins to devalue the moral status of the out-group and
rationalizes harmful actions against them.22 Paradoxically, intergroup conflict can enhance the
cohesiveness and morale of each group as hostility deepens between the groups.
Identity can be used to mobilize support for the in-group and opposition against the outgroup, but it does not conclusively determine behavior. Many other factors such as the
individual’s own interests influence behavior. A study on group identity in South Africa found
that strong group sympathies do not necessarily lead to out-group antipathies and that the lack of

19

J. C. Turner et al., Rediscovering the social group: A self-categorization theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), 50.
M. Billig and H. Tajfel, “Social categorization and similarity in intergroup behavior,” European Journal of Social
Psychology 3, no. 1 (1973): 27–51.
21
Ervin Staub, “Genocide and Mass Killing: Origins, Prevention, Healing and Reconciliation,” Political Psychology
21, no. 2 (2000): 370.
22
S. Opotaw, “Special issue on Moral Exclusion and Injustice,” Journal of Social Issues 46, no. 1 (1990): 47-65.
20
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intergroup contact was the best predictor of interracial intolerance. 23 Despite their inherently
exclusive nature, identities can also form around the values of tolerance and respect toward
others. Identity itself does not cause people to harm others. In Rwanda, Hutus did not kill Tutsis
purely because of their Hutu identity. Rather, their Hutu identity was manipulated to justify
killing to protect their ethnic group. Nonetheless, the salience of an identity in a certain context
does influence political behavior and the justification of that behavior.
These three qualities of identity as conditional, relational, and directive illustrate its
significance with regard to political behavior. Accordingly, notions of identity based upon
membership in the ethnic group, nation, region, and world also carry these intrinsic qualities.
Ethnicity, nationality, regional identity, and global citizenship constitute just a few of the
possible identities within an individual’s self-conception, but they are the most relevant to the
relationship between citizen and state in postcolonial sub-Saharan Africa. Ethnic groups in subSaharan Africa had developed sociopolitical organizations to govern themselves before the
advent of colonization. Members of the ethnic groups belonged to political entities, to which they
pledged their allegiance as citizens would to their state. Many of these ethnic institutions
continue to exist today. Hence, loyalty to the ethnic group, which is held together by one kind of
political organization, fundamentally conflicts with loyalty to the nation, which is bound together
by another kind of political organization – the state. Although a person can identify with both
ethnicity and nationality, the salience of ethnic identity depends upon the salience of national
identity, and vice versa. Similarly, allegiance to the greater region conflicts with loyalty to the
nation. Identification with the international community, the most inclusive identity of all, clashes
with all three of the other more bounded identities because it requires all of them to converge

23

James L. Gibson, “Do Strong Group Identities Fuel Intolerance? Evidence from the South African Case,” Political
Psychology 27, no. 5 (2006): 665-705.
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together under one global identity. The general relationships among each of these identities for
ethnically heterogeneous countries are illustrated in the following:
Ethnic < National < Regional < Global
Note: x<y indicates that x is less inclusive than y
Postcolonial sub-Saharan Africa offers a unique context in which to apply social identity theory
and to compare how these different identities guide political behavior.
Ethnicity
Definition
Ethnicity is commonly defined as a primordial quality determined by one’s blood or
heritage.24 This fixed and static conceptualization of ethnicity has been challenged by various
scholars. Bruce Berman asserts that ethnicity is a dynamic, socially-constructed identity that is
the “outcome of the continuous and generally conflict-ridden interaction of political, economic
and cultural forces both external and internal to developing ethnic communities.”25 Objective
characteristics related to common ancestry and subjective perceptions of ethnicity by both
insiders and outsiders contribute to determining the importance of ethnic identity. 26 Rarely
isolated or self-sufficient, ethnic groups are permeable entities that continually engage in cultural
exchange with other social groups. Nevertheless, ethnic groups have drawn lines between each
other even if they share similar ancestries. Witness the adamant self-differentiation among many
Israelis and Arabs in the Middle East. Ethnicity has been defined by the boundaries of race,
religion, language, and other exclusive characteristics, but for the sake of distinguishing ethnic

24

Clifford Geertz, ed., Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Africa and Asia (New York: The
Free Press, 1967).
25
Bruce J. Berman, “Ethnicity, Patronage and the African State: The Politics of Uncivil Nationalism,” African
Affairs 97, no. 388 (1998): 310.
26
Ibid., 44.
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identity from nationality, the term “ethnic group” will be used in place of what is often referred
to as a “tribe.”27
Despite the socially-constructed nature of ethnicity, an individual’s fixed conception of
his ethnicity can be highly important to him. This is because, regardless of whether an ethnicity
has long existed or was recently fabricated, it is deeply rooted in one’s sense of self. One’s selfdefinition includes both identities that are often conceptualized to be impermanent and
changeable, such as occupational identity, and identities that are understood to be permanent and
unchangeable, such as ethnic and racial identity. This widespread view that ethnicity is an
immutable attribute demonstrates that it is a firmly established part of people’s identities. Once
someone is born as Japanese, she cannot change herself into another ethnicity. The conception of
Japaneseness may be dynamic and different for each individual, but being Japanese is something
that endures from birth until death. Hence, a threat to one’s ethnic group can also be seen as a
threat to the fundamental self.28
Ethnic Identity and Behavior
Because of the rootedness of ethnic identity in the self-conception, ethnicity has been
manipulated as an instrument to achieve political and economic ends.29 Different circumstances
can trigger ethnic identity and lead individuals to engage in discriminatory behavior toward non-

27

In sub-Saharan Africa, this sort of ethnic grouping has been referred to as a “tribe.” Examples of ethnic groups
include the Baganda in Uganda and Xulu in South Africa. Despite its widespread use, there are negative and
demeaning connotations associated with the word “tribe,” which is usually employed to refer to non-Western ethnic
groups. See for more information on the use of “tribe”: “Words Matter: Terms of Global Conflict Debated,”
National Public Radio, February 7, 2008, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=18767319. Hence,
this thesis will use the term “ethnic group” to refer to what is usually conceptualized as a “tribe.” Most ethnic groups
in Africa are differentiated by language. Since linguistic boundaries do not always demarcate ethnic boundaries, as
in the case of the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa of Rwanda, linguistic distinctions is not the basis of defining ethnicity in this
thesis. In the case of Uganda, this thesis will study what are generally agreed to be ethnic groups. A map of the
traditional regions of inhabitance of these ethnic groups is provided in Appendix C.
28
Robert Daul, Polyarchy (New Haven, CT: Yale University, 1971), 115.
29
Abner Cohen, Custom and Politics in Urban Africa: A Study of Hausa Migrants in a Yoruba Town (London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969).
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members of their ethnic group. 30 Ethnocentric individuals, who identify strongly with their
ethnicity, maintain a belief that their ethnic group is centrally important and judge other groups
relative to their own.31 Ethnocentric arguments have justified many inexplicably horrific events
in human history, including genocide and ethnic cleansing.
No doubt, a complex web of factors determines an individual’s decision to take part in
collective action with other members of their ethnicity. Whatever the motivations and whatever
the mechanisms, human beings throughout history have taken various actions in the past that
were obviously aligned along ethnic lines. But if these actors did not possess a relatively strong
ethnic identity, hurting members of the out-group to benefit the in-group would not have been an
option. Devising a comprehensive theory to explain how and why ethnic conflict emerges is
beyond the scope of this thesis. Nonetheless, it is possible to infer that the importance of ethnic
identity to the individual and those around the individual is a requisite for his choosing to engage
in ethnocentric behavior. This does not mean, however, that the stronger the salience of ethnic
identity, the greater the likelihood of violent ethnic-based conflict. Deciding to engage in conflict
remains the prerogative of the individual, but various contingent factors can facilitate the
tendency for people to act on behalf of their group based upon their shared ethnicity.
Ethnicity in Sub-Saharan Africa
In sub-Saharan Africa, ethnic identity has particular strength and importance, but the
postcolonial state has enhanced the salience of national identity. Ethnic identities had initially
carried more weight than national identity because of the artificial nature of postcolonial nations.
National identity as defined by the state came into existence fairly recently in sub-Saharan Africa.
30

Some blame ethnic conflict on the elite by claiming that they manipulate the non-elite to fight against other ethnic
groups. However, scholars continue to puzzle over why the masses follow the elites. Different theories to explain
ethnic conflict are explored and critiqued in this seminal work: Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Los
Angeles, University of California Press, 1985).
31
W. G. Sumner, Folkways (New York: Ginn, 1906).
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European colonizers had fabricated the boundaries of each nation. In order to prevent the
unification of indigenous groups against their rule, British colonial regimes discouraged the
integration of ethnic groups within each colony. By reinforcing ethnic identification, the British
forestalled the rise of collective consciousness and a common identity among the different
groups. Through divide-and-rule policies, colonial governments pitted indigenous ethnic groups
against each other in pursuit of the social and economic advantages offered by the colonial
bureaucracy. 32 As social identity theory suggests, colonial policies have served to heighten
competition among different social groups, in this case, ethnic groups. In part, because of this
colonial legacy of division, many countries in sub-Saharan Africa have suffered from internal
fragmentation and conflict.
During the precolonial period, Africans had governed themselves through their own
political organizations, which spanned the gamut from centralized kingdoms to decentralized
kinship networks. These forms of social organization exist today but have lost considerable
influence with the advent of colonialism and the ensuing postcolonial state. With the rise of the
latter, the political role of the former has diminished. It is increasingly difficult for the
indigenous people to remain loyal to their ethnic political organization. Although their ethnic
identities may direct them to adhere to their traditional leaders’ regulations and expectations,
these laws and duties often conflict with those of the central government. The state has the upper
hand because its authority is bolstered by more international recognition and a greater capacity to
enforce its laws. Nevertheless, ethnic tensions have been transferred to the national level.
Scholars attribute the failure of democratization in African countries to the strength of
ethnic identity. Donald Horowitz argues that the more ethnically divided a country is, the more
difficult it is for democratization to succeed: while democracy encourages inclusivity, ethnicity
32

Christopher Clapham, Third World Politics: An Introduction (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985).
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is fundamentally exclusive.33 Bringing a new perspective to the role of civil society in relation to
violent conflict in India, Ashutosh Varshney explains that intraethnic civic associations fail to
prevent ethnic violence and underlines the importance of building trust among ethnic groups
through the formation of interethnic civic networks.34 Civic associations founded on the common
denominator of ethnicity can actually organize violence against those of other ethnic groups.
Hutu Power, a civic association based upon Hutu identity, instigated ethnic conflict and division
in Rwanda. Many political parties throughout the continent today have ethnic-based
constituencies even though numerous regimes have prohibited the formation of political parties
explicitly formed around an ethnicity.35 Some scholars describe postcolonial African states as
neopatrimonial regimes that maintain their authority through personal patronage: politicians
construct networks of political support based on kinship or ethnic ties.36 In addition, there are
widespread perceptions that public officials who have the responsibility of working for the
nation often engage in corrupt acts to benefit their ethnic group. However, this common
characterization of African politics as “tribal” is an overgeneralization. When asked to choose
between ethnic and national identity, 70 percent of respondents to surveys across sub-Saharan
Africa claimed that they felt “only national” or “equally national and ethnic.”37 Both ethnic and
national identities play important roles in guiding political behavior in sub-Saharan Africa. This
changing landscape of identity in Africa is often overshadowed by the legacy of ethnic conflict
on the continent.
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In Rwanda, people mobilized along ethnic lines in a struggle over power. Like the British,
Belgian colonial rule had encouraged ethnic fragmentation in Rwanda. Belgians issued racial
identification cards, officially labeling people as Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa, and they favored the Tutsis,
claiming that they were intellectually and racially superior to Hutus. 38 Heightening ethnic
differences exacerbated tensions between the two groups even though they shared virtually the
same culture and spoke the same language. The end of colonialism did not spell the end of ethnic
divisions. Hutu resentment against the politically and socioeconomically advantaged Tutsis
continued to deepen even after the first Rwandan elections brought a Hutu-dominated
government into power. Building tensions led to genocide. Extremist group Hutu Power rallied
Hutus to systematically slaughter Tutsis and non-compliant Hutus. After the genocide, the
Rwandan government prohibited political activity emphasizing Hutu or Tutsi identity and erased
ethnicity from identity cards in an effort to reduce ethnic identification. Behind this façade of
reconciliation and de-ethnicization, people’s ethnic identities tenaciously endure.39 The Rwandan
case tragically illustrates how certain conditions enhanced the salience of ethnic identity. The
Hutus perceived their ethnic group to be in a relatively lower position than the Tutsis. They then
mobilized themselves around their common ethnic identity to exterminate the Tutsi, whom they
blamed for their disadvantaged circumstances. Individual Hutus took part in genocidal acts
because they perceived that they themselves were threatened by the Tutsis. The strength of
ethnic identity prevented many Hutus and Tutsis from seeing each other as members of a
common nation.
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Nationality
Definition
The idea of the nation assumes that nationals share a common past, present, and future.
According to Anthony Smith, national identity rests upon several unifying factors including
shared myths of origin, a claim to a common homeland, a common mass culture, and equal rights
and duties under the law. 40 Bound by these shared qualities, nationals collectively strive to
achieve their common interests. Yet, perceptions of such commonalities are often unfounded,
leading scholars such as Benedict Anderson to call nations “imagined communities.”41 This is
especially the case in sub-Saharan Africa, where postcolonial states define membership in
nations along colonially-imposed boundaries. In this context, arbitrary characteristics, such as
one’s birthplace, determine one’s citizenship in the nation. These requirements for citizenship do
not necessarily demonstrate that an individual shares a common history and common interests
with the rest of the nation. Even if people strongly believe that they belong to a community with
other nationals, most of them will never meet each other and thus will never discover whether
they indeed do have more in common than they do with nonnationals. These imagined
communities have significant real implications for intranational and international relations.
Bolstering national identity can reduce ethnic conflict by providing a source of
crosscutting identification among ethnic groups, but it can also justify the destruction of other
nations. States inspire love and self-sacrifice for the nation, but they also instill fear and hate for
the “Other.” 42 Drawing boundaries between nationals and foreigners, national identity often
crystallizes against the “Other.” Before the nineteenth century, the French was the “Other” for
the British. Warfare between the two nations reflected and reinforced these perceived differences
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as they built their identities against each other. For the Occident, the “Other” is the Orient; the
Occident defined itself based upon what the Orient was not. Romanticized depictions of Asia and
the Middle East served to justify Western imperial ambitions.43
Warfare between nations helped build the modern state by standardizing and polarizing
identities. War forced disparate groups to join together under the state by creating the existential
need to break out of kinship-based organizations and to build centralized political structures.44
War itself had a homogenizing effect on identity, as soldiers fought on behalf of the entire nation
and civilians contributed to national war efforts.45 The convergence of identity within the state
coincided with increased differentiation between states. States also mobilize their populations
against their enemies by encouraging the crystallization of national identity against the “Other.”
Kamikaze suicide bombers in Japan during World War II willingly sacrificed their lives to attack
the United States for the sake of the Japanese nation. Mass propaganda during World War II
clearly illustrates how the state’s distorted portrayal of enemy nationals as barbaric and
animalistic rendered it extremely difficult for citizens to identify with them as fellow human
beings.
The boundaries of existing states are not always aligned with those of extant nations, but
the state and nation are closely interrelated. For some ethnically homogeneous countries such as
Japan, ethnic identity and national identity are equated, so loyalty to the ethnic group also means
devotion to the nation. But this is not the case for many countries. Although initially composed
of diverse nations, the Soviet Union eventually disintegrated into different states that claimed to
represent the different nations. The principle of self-determination has been evoked in countless
circumstances during struggles for independence and recognition of sovereignty. Members of the
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nation assert a right to sovereignty and statehood because they perceive themselves as an
autonomous group.46 Ethnonationalists in separatist movements thus reject the legitimacy of the
existing state’s rule and agitate for their own state. Although it disagrees on the exact meaning of
self-determination, the international community has reached a general consensus that nations
should have the right to choose without external coercion the government under which they will
live. The United Nations charter includes a declaration of the people’s right to self-determination
(Article I, Chapter I, Part 2).47 Thus, stateless groups such as the Kurds, Basques, and French
Canadians have claimed that they are nations separate from the states that rule them and formed
their own national identities on this premise.
Despite such challenges, the idea of the nation carries tremendous power because of its
“naturalness” and rootedness in the past. However, every nation has been created. Some nations,
such as the French nation, currently have firmly established and well-defined identities. But each
began as a collection of different, often conflicting ethnic groups that were gradually integrated
into one nation under the state. State-led nationalism crafted nations where they previously did
not exist.48 According to Earnest Gellner, nationalism in Europe primarily arose in tandem with
the transition from agrarian to industrial society: the functioning of a large complex industrial
society, where people must cope with continually shifting functions and positions, necessitated
cultural homogenization through state-led mass education.49 One standard language was selected
by the state and used as a medium for generating and communicating national histories,
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traditions, and myths. Nationalism had a unifying effect upon the population but also induced
conflict and separation from the state by ethnic groups, who asserted their own right to
nationhood and statehood. The nation-state prototype, in which the state rules over a single,
homogeneous nation, has served as the ideal for many different nationalist movements around
the world.
Nationality in Sub-Saharan Africa
While recognizing these subtleties in defining the “nation,” this thesis will refer to the
“nation” as defined by the state in order to narrow its focus on the role of the African state and
nationalized History education in promoting national identity. In fact, the development of
national identity in Africa shares some similarities with the rise of nationhood in Europe but
differs in many respects. Indigenous people appropriated the European-bred idea of nationhood
in their struggles for independence. African freedom fighters used nationalist rhetoric to frame
their demands for independence and sovereignty to their European colonizers. Although the
colonizers had imposed the boundaries of each colony, new nations sprung from these
boundaries. With increasing collaboration among the colonized in resistance to European
colonial rule, national identities based upon the common experience of colonial oppression
gradually formed in each colony. Tunisian Albert Memmi famously describes the dichotomy of
the colonizer and the colonized: one cannot exist without the other. The colonized cannot define
themselves without referring to their colonial relationship with the colonizer.50 Africans defined
themselves against their “Other,” the colonizer, in nationalist movements for independence.
Across the continent, Africans of different ethnic groups temporarily united in opposition against
a common enemy, but their unity was by no means seamless: deep internal in the coalitions
manifested themselves even more clearly after gaining independence.
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National identity remains weak in sub-Saharan Africa because national boundaries do not
reflect ethnic realities. While some states have covertly engaged in proxy wars with neighboring
countries, there have been very few instances of nationwide mobilization in preparation for war
against another country. The strength of ethnic identity has posed challenges to national
integration: because citizens of the nation do not identify strongly with each other, they can
identify against each other, making interethnic conflict more likely.
Claiming their right to nationhood and statehood, some ethnic groups in sub-Saharan
Africa chose the path of secession from the state. Leaders of secessionist movements demand
independence and recognition of their ethnicity as a nationality. Larger collective identities
beyond the traditional ethnic group (i.e. Dinka, Nuer) have been at the forefront of rhetoric
advocating the secession of southern Sudan. Various non-Arab ethnic groups traditionally
inhabiting southern Sudan collectively identify themselves as “southerners” and call the Arabs
“northerners.” However, not all Sudanese living in either region agree with these distinctions,
and many oppose secession along the borders drawn by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
During the 2011 historic referendum determining southern Sudan’s separation from the rest of
Sudan, the landslide vote for secession was accompanied by violent clashes in a contested area of
the central region.
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such circumstances may actually make people more amenable to adopting regional identities to
unite with their ethnic counterparts in other countries.
Regional Identity
Definition
Regional identity presumes the common characteristics and shared identity of numerous
nations and ethnicities in a specific region.52 Citizens of different states within in a region often
find that they share a common historical memory. For instance, Latin American identity
encompasses countries as far apart as Mexico and Argentina; citizens of these countries share the
common legacy of Spanish or Portuguese colonization. Ethnic and national identity can have
strong ties to regional identity. Egyptian identity, generally speaking, has a strong association
with Arab identity, even if Egyptian and Arab identities are distinct from each other. Similarly,
ethnic identities in sub-Saharan Africa are linked to African identity. Recent efforts toward
regional integration through the establishment of communal institutions indicate the growing
importance of regional groupings, particularly in the realm of economics. Virtually all states are
now members of multiple regional associations, which span the globe from the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations to the Union of South American Nations.
Regional organizations provide forums for countries of the same geographic region to
make collective decisions for the future of the region. Regional institutions promote integration
and solidarity among the member states, but regional identity generally remains politically feeble
in comparison to ethnic and national identity. The behavior of government representatives in the
regional organizations reflects an attachment to national identities over regional identities.
Member states accuse each other of prioritizing their national interests over the goals of the
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regional community. For example, despite the creation of a trilateral bloc through the North
American Free Trade Agreement, the United States’ heavy subsidies for corn have adversely
affected poor Mexican corn farmers.53
The European Union (EU) has made significant strides in increasing regional economic
and political integration, but its member states also grapple with the conflict between the
promotion of national identity and European identity. The creation of the EU as a regional bloc
has enabled Europeans to collectively compete against the existential threats of the United States
and Japan. Member states have made conscious efforts to promote greater unity and the
European identity as they gradually liberalize their trade policies with other EU members and
loosen immigration restrictions on other Europeans. However, more powerful member states
hold tremendous sway over the actions of regional institutions, reflecting existing power
dynamics in the region. For instance, the six founding members of the EU have hesitated to
expand membership to include applicant countries with weaker economies and tendencies for
instability because of the potential negative impacts upon their own nations. Nationals also worry
that merging into a larger regional entity dilutes their national identities. French political parties
such as Front National voice their opposition to continued European integration, arguing that
Europeanization has led to the deterioration of French culture. These concerns illustrate how the
increasingly influential European identity has posed a challenge to each member country’s fixed
conceptions of national identity.
Regional Identity in Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan African states’ adamant claims to their own independence also hindered the
development of a cohesive regional identity. In Africa, heads of state made similar attempts to
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build a regional organization to represent the interests of the continent, but the newly created
institutions continue to emphasize the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each member state.
The formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 reflected the importance of
African regional identity to political leaders throughout the continent and signaled their
commitment to liberating all Africans from the common oppression of colonization and
apartheid (see Article II, 1.a.).54 This pledge to free other Africans echoes the ideals of PanAfricanism. The rise of Pan-Africanist ideas and the négritude movement reflected the
development of an African or Black identity that transcended the boundaries of colonial regimes.
Intellectuals of the African Diaspora and the African continent wrote and spoke about the
common oppression of all people of African descent by Europeans through the implements of
slavery, racism, and colonization. They thus argued that the African people experienced a shared
history and needed to join together to overcome common obstacles to their unity. Colonial
borders only served to split the African community apart. Because of his belief in these ideas,
Kwame Nkrumah declared that “Africa is one continent, one people, and one nation.”55
Even though the OAU claimed to represent the collective interests of all Africans, it also
maintained a strong commitment to respecting state sovereignty and the sanctity of states’
existing borders (see Article III, 3.).56 Often dubbed the “Dictator’s Club,” the OAU failed to
protect the rights of the African people as it claimed; instead, it gained a reputation for
supporting the status quo as member states reciprocally ignored the atrocities committed within
each other’s countries.57 The successor to the OAU, the African Union (AU) was established in
1999 and symbolized the recentering of the organization on people rather than on states.
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However, the AU also maintained an adherence to the principle of noninterference in the internal
affairs of member states (see Article 4, g.) while declaring the right of the AU to intervene in
“grave circumstances” with the Assembly’s approval (see Article 4, h.). 58 This movement
towards collective governance has also taken place at a smaller regional level.
East African states have also pushed toward regional integration and have considered
serious proposals for joining together as a single sovereign state. Initially established in 1967 by
Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda, the East African Community (EAC) fell apart in 1977 due to
ideological differences and conflicting economic interests among the leaders of the newly
independent states. In 1999, the heads of state of these countries revived the EAC, and in 2007,
they expanded its membership to include Burundi and Rwanda (see Appendix B for a map of the
EAC).59 Although definitions of “East Africa” have included the Horn of Africa, member states
of the EAC promote a particular definition of East Africa in their campaigns for regional
integration. Note the subjective nature of cardinal directions when used to demarcate regions:
West simply ends where East begins, and North extends south until it reaches the northern tip of
South.
Similar to the borders of its member states, the boundaries of the regional group reflect
colonial legacies. The British had initially grouped the three colonies into what they named the
East African region. Kenya and Uganda united in a customs union in 1917, and Tanganyika, the
predecessor to Tanzania, later joined them in 1927.60 A strong proponent of the EAC, Ugandan
President Museveni refers to the shared past experiences of the East African states in his
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arguments for regional integration. 61 He envisions uniting the entire continent together using
regional blocs as building blocks.62
But the existence of regional organizations is not a sufficient measure of the salience of
regional identity among the general population. The ordinary citizen did not participate in the
formation of these regional institutions. Those in political power appoint a few individuals as
their country’s representatives, and these delegates participate in the policy-making process,
alienating the vast majority of the people they represent. African statesmen, many of whom were
perceived as illegitimate, established both the OAU and the AU.
The same ideas of social identity theory apply in explaining the guiding role of regional
identity on political behavior in Africa. There exists a widespread notion of African identity and
an appreciation for shared values among different nations and ethnicities, especially among those
with darker skin, but this identification does not include serious calls for political unity. The
African social group lacks cohesion and a common vision for the future, and Africans in general
do not feel collectively menaced by any outside group. These challenges in perception hinder the
development of solidarity among the African population. Instances of xenophobic violence
continue against African migrants in South Africa.63 After the demise of President Ggabo, the
people of Côte d’Ivoire struggle to abandon the doctrine of “Ivorité,” which divided the nation
into “Ivorite” and “non-Ivorites.”64 In these circumstances, a highly exclusive notion of national
identity guided chauvinistic behavior against other Africans labeled as nonnationals and
overpowered any notions of shared African identity.
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Global Identity
Definition
A more inclusive identification with the global community reflects the transcending of
ethnic, national, and regional borders. Global identity65 assumes that human beings throughout
the world share common characteristics, values, and responsibility for their communal past,
present, and future. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights expresses these ideals and
recognizes “the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the
human family.”66 People with global identity identify with those of other ethnicities, nations, and
regions as equal members of a common world community. Citing the interdependence of all
states, liberal international relations theorists call for interstate cooperation to combat common
threats. States throughout the world increasingly recognize the need for international cooperation
to overcome global challenges such as global warming that impact the welfare of nations
throughout the world. International organizations such as the United Nations (UN), International
Criminal Court, and the World Trade Organization develop international laws to govern all
nations. These international organizations uphold the sovereignty of the state 67 except under
serious circumstances meriting international intervention. Concepts of “human rights,” “crimes
against humanity,” and “humanitarian intervention” all echo the international consensus on the
responsibility of all people, as members of a global community, to protect the lives and rights of
other human beings.
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The effects of globalization have raised greater awareness of the bonds tying together the
human community. Increased flows of information as a result of the dissemination of
inexpensive technology have brought people, who may never meet physically, closer together.
Experiencing these trends toward international integration, people throughout the world have
become more conscious of their interconnectedness with other human beings. As national
borders become more porous, states lose their ability to control the flow of economic, cultural,
and social exchange with other nations. Thus, international integration has reduced the state’s
capacity to control its citizens and transformed the traditional relationship between the citizen
and the state. Because of these trends, an international system, based upon the principles of state
sovereignty and nonintervention set forth by the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, no longer appears
to be a workable paradigm. Under the Westphalian model, states are the principal actors in
international relations, but contemporary states encounter significant challenges in monitoring
their territory and excluding foreign actors. Noncitizens play gradually more influential roles
within the domestic realm of each state. International economic integration has enabled
transnational corporations to do business in several different countries at once. International nongovernmental organizations play an important role in building a world culture because of their
fairly autonomous status from states.68
Global identity stands out in contrast from the other forms of identity because of the
contrasting role of the “Other” in group identity formation. Cosmopolitanist Emmanuel Levinas
defines the “Other” as anyone outside of the self and explains that people depend upon others,
and thus each other, to define themselves.69 Desmond Tutu articulates a similar concept in the
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African philosophy of Ubuntu: “My humanity is caught up, is inextricably bound up, in
yours…A person is a person through other persons.”70 Under the framework of global identity,
one needs the “Other” in order to exist. Instead of identifying against the “Other,” one welcomes
the “Other” into the same community.
In sub-Saharan Africa and the rest of the world, global identity in general does not have
the same strength as ethnic, national, and regional identities because of the lack of collective
global awareness necessary for building a global community. Global identity nonetheless guides
individuals to behave toward other human beings, regardless of their ethnic, national, or regional
background, in a respectful and equitable manner.
Commonalities of Different Identities
Different theories provide disparate conceptualizations of ethnic, national, regional, and
global identities, but social identity theory explains the influence of all identities upon behavior.
Although each social group defines identity at different frames of reference and carries different
sets of expectations, all four identities share two characteristics that underscore the importance of
History education in identity formation: First, all are founded upon an assumption of a common
past. Second, all were created and continues to be re-created in a dynamic and fluid fashion.
First, all identities presuppose the common history of group members, but each identity
frames the past in a different way. The ethnic group focuses on the collective narrative of the
people who compose the ethnic group, while the nation tells the experiences shared by people
throughout the nation. Regions also base their identities on historical ties between member
nations. The international community joined together to form the United Nations after
experiencing the horrors of World War II. The common experiences of the past bond people
together and create a feeling of community. In addition to sharing the past, people share the
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present and future as they move forward together as a group. Through the lens of ethnic identity,
the ethnic group is the most important social unit, while from a globalized perspective,
fragmentations into more exclusive identities are based upon artificial notions of a shared past,
which should be abandoned for a more inclusive global identity.
Second, each identity was fabricated and continues to undergo change. Group members
forge the group’s identity from within, and outsiders contribute to shaping the group from
without. The “Other” has played a significant role in the formation of each group. For ethnic,
national, or regional groups, competition with the out-groups helped solidify the unity of the ingroup. Lines drawn between the group and the “Other” sharpen with the rise of collective
consciousness within the group, with the exception of the global community. However, the
definitions and boundaries of each identity have shifted through time and across individuals.
Therefore, despite the manufactured and dynamic nature of each identity, each is
perceived to be firmly rooted in the past and has a powerful potential for guiding behavior, and
each social group transmits its collective narrative to future generations to bolster its social
identity. But the ethnic group, region, and international community differ from the nation in one
important respect: the state reinforces the idea of the nation, whereas the other social groups are
not organized into political units with the same magnitude of power and influence. Moreover, the
state is responsible for the powerful function of providing a national narrative that will be taught
to its young citizens in schools throughout the country. History education creates a foundation
for identity as students learn about their common past, whether it is that of the ethnic group,
nation, region, or world. At the same time, History education presents a certain understanding of
a social group’s past. The next chapter explores this relationship between History education and
identity formation with an emphasis upon the role of the state in nation-building.
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CHAPTER II: HISTORY EDUCATION AND IDENTITY FORMATION

“The sense of ‘whence we came’ is central to the definition of ‘who we are’.”
– Anthony D. Smith, National Identity, p.22

Within countries, different groups vie to influence the national narrative studied in
schools. These struggles reflect the widespread assumption that the historical knowledge taught
to students greatly influences their identity. This chapter offers a theoretical basis for explaining
how History teaching helps shape the identities discussed in Chapter One. In particular, statesponsored History education provides a national narrative as a foundation for the construction of
national identity. Case studies of France, Japan, Prussia, and Tanzania – formerly nationless
regions that have developed strong and relatively well-defined national identities – demonstrate
the link between nationalized education and the formation of the nation. The experiences of other
states’ nation-building endeavors inform Chapter Three and Four’s case study of identity and
education in Uganda.
History Education and Nation-building
Nationalized History education helps build nations because it provides a shared national
narrative. All of the collective identities examined in Chapter One are founded upon a belief in a
common past. The national narrative is thus a requisite for the formation of a cohesive national
identity. An individual’s understanding of her current position in the world is based upon what
she remembers. Beyond simply teaching the past, History education builds the foundation for an
individual’s national identity by transmitting the myths and values of the nation. Eric Hobsbawm
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claims that schooling is “the most powerful weapon for forming … nations.”71 Governments
have employed history education to unify the nation under the state and to homogenize the
population by instilling pride and loyalty to the nation over ethnicity.
Comparing History Education with Other Sources of Historical Knowledge
The teaching of the past is not limited to History education. While studying other subjects
in school, students inevitably encounter history. Students learn about past scientific discoveries
and theories in their Science classes and read passages about historical events in their English
classes. Furthermore, teachers of all subjects also draw in their own historical knowledge from
outside of the curriculum while teaching their students. Thus, even within schools, students learn
about history from multiple sources of information. Aside from the content of the national
History curriculum, the language of instruction, religious education, and civic education
contribute to the historical knowledge provided to students in school.
Language is tied to history in many respects. Most sub-Saharan African states have
designated one language, usually that of their former colonizers, as the language of instruction in
their schools. Some African intellectuals decry these language policies as a form of linguistic
imperialism: selecting a single language as the national language hastens the loss of indigenous
languages and cultures. Kenyan writer Ngugi wa Thiong’o famously renounced writing in
English and decided to primarily write in his mother tongue, Gikuyu. His bold choice reflects his
desire to immerse his writing in Gikuyu culture: language conveys culture and reflects the way
that people perceive their place in the world because language forms images of the world in
people’s minds.72 In addition to carrying culture, language contains the collective memory of
those who speak the language. When students learn about the history of their ethnic groups and
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nation in another language, such as English, certain nuances conveyed through their local
language are lost. For example, the Buganda people of Uganda are known for using many
proverbs when telling their stories. Despite the homogenizing effects of one-language policy,
many attribute the success of Tanzania’s nation-building efforts to its designation of Kiswahili as
the national language: the government requires schools to teach in this unifying indigenous
language. 73 Using Kiswahili as the medium of communication for teaching has enabled
Tanzanian students of different ethnicities to communicate to and identify with each other.74
Religion, like language, is also intertwined with identity and history. Religious education
includes the transmission of historical knowledge because sacred scriptures contain stories about
the past. For instance, the New Testament records the lives and teachings of Jesus Christ and his
followers. At Pakistani madrassas, students study Islam by reading the Qur’an and Hadith. They
thus base their understanding of history on the content of ancient religious texts. In Uganda,
students study Christian Religious Education or Islamic Religious Education depending upon the
founding body of their school.75 But religious education as a source of historical information
differs from History education: neither Christianity nor Islam is taught uniformly throughout the
country, whereas students learn the same History in all regions of Uganda. Therefore, religious
education is also a contributor to students’ historical knowledge but does not have the same
influence and legitimacy as nationalized History education.
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Grooming young people to fulfill their civic duties to the nation necessitates fostering
national pride. Schools at times include Civic education as a separate subject to inculcate
national values and patriotism. Along with teaching about citizenship in the nation, Civic
education teaches the nation’s past. Schools in the United States have used civic education to
teach democratic ideals and patriotism since the early twentieth century.76 Ugandan schools do
not teach Civics as a separate subject, but through History education, they teach students about
their government and the importance of national unity.
Primary and secondary school students learn about history from other sources apart from
nationalized education. The media, encompassing newspapers, radio, and television, provides
explanations about the causes and consequences of various events in the past. Parents and
grandparents teach their own version of history to their children. Religious organizations,
community members, and peer groups also supplement students’ historical knowledge. Thus,
even though History education does not monopolize students’ understanding of the past, it is the
most influential form of transmitting historical knowledge for two central reasons: First, schools
are effective socializing agents. Second, schools hold sway over young people at a critical stage
of identity development.
Education as the Socialization of Youth
First, primary and secondary schools have immense socializing effects because of the
perceived legitimacy of the information they communicate to students. Schools instill knowledge,
skills, attitudes, and values into students, who can use these assets to gain a higher status in
society. Societal structures reinforce the belief that the information taught in schools is valuable
to one’s personal success because education provides the means for improving one’s life,
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particularly economically. According to legitimation theory, mass education legitimates a certain
theory of knowledge and specific types of knowledge over others by institutionalizing a basic
educational classification system, basic rules for employment, and rules for professional
certification. 77 In other words, education defines access to desired social positions. Noam
Chomsky explains that “once you are educated, you have already been socialized in ways that
support the power structure, which, in turn, rewards you infinitely.” 78 Schools reproduce and
perpetuate social, economic, and cultural hierarchies through their indoctrination of students.79
These social inequalities are reinforced when students learn a version of history that privileges
the perspective of dominant elites.
Michel Foucault emphasizes the inseparable relationship between historical knowledge
and power. 80 The dominant political and economic apparatuses including universities, the
military, and the media exercise hegemony over the production and transmission of truth, and the
inculcation of this “truth” into the people through education helps sustain and extend the power
of the elites.81 The content of the national History curriculum is a state-sanctioned “truth” and
carries the legitimacy of the state. It is thus considered as valid knowledge. When schools test
students on their historical knowledge based upon what they learn in History, they institute the
History curriculum as “truth” along with grammar rules in English and the Pythagorean Theorem
in Mathematics. Furthermore, students study History as its own separate subject in an organized,
usually chronological, manner. Thus, in comparison to other sources of historical information,
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History education is often easily accepted as history because of its institutionalization in
educational systems.
Second, History education has a relatively large influence during a crucial period of
identity formation. Psychologist Erik Erikson observes that identity takes shape over time
beginning in childhood through a process of “reflection and observation.” 82 Developmental
psychologist Jean Piaget further theorizes that national identity becomes clearly visible from
ages eight to eleven.83 Thus, the age of adolescence is an especially central period of identity
development in one’s life. During their childhood, people spend around six hours every weekday
in the classroom with their teacher and fellow students instead of at home with their family.
Boarding students only return home during their holidays and have even less contact with their
family and community of origin. As they spend less time with their family, students spend more
time being socialized in school. A survey of students in Ghanaian schools suggest the validity of
Piaget’s assertion that national identification develops early in life and generally endures once
established and reinforced. The study inferred student’s awareness of their nationality from their
responses to the question, “What is the name of your nation?” While only 40 percent of primary
students responded correctly, 92 percent of secondary school students responded correctly.84 The
results suggest that nationalized education plays a significant role in crystallizing children’s
national identity through continual reinforcement.
Challenges of Teaching History
Because of the powerful effects of History education on identity, states must address
numerous problems involved in teaching History and developing a national History curriculum.
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First, in comparison to other subjects such as English and Math, History has unclear objectives
and expected outcomes. For example, governments set literacy as a goal for English teaching,
and they assess the achievement of that goal through fairly objective criteria such as
demonstrating the ability to read and write simple sentences. On the other hand, the objectives of
History teaching are less well-defined, difficult to measure, and sometimes conflict. Objectives
may include both the inculcation of national values and the development of skills in critically
analyzing information, but as students hone their critical thinking skills, they may also begin to
question and reject national values. Measuring the level of students’ patriotism and critical
thinking skills is also not a straightforward task.
Second, inherent subjectivity plagues all national Histories because of the impossibility
of including every recounting of past events, not to mention the inaccuracy of human memory.
More and more interpretations of past events surface every day but often do not find their way
into History textbooks; since the History curriculum must be developed before teachers receive
training and students begin learning, it cannot be continually updated without significant costs.
According to a survey of United States History textbooks, the information presented to students
differs greatly from recent developments and popular consensus in academia. 85 Historians
themselves disagree over the reliability and validity of different sources of historical knowledge.
In the field of education, debates have exploded over how teachers should teach students the
causality and consequences of events. Some argue that since history is a story, every nation
should have its own way of telling its version of the story. 86 Although each individual
experiences and recounts the past in their own way, states can construct a more inclusive national
narrative. After World War II, Germany revised its History curriculum to more accurately
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portray the brutality of its regime toward minorities.87 Germans reduced the bias associated with
their History curriculum by incorporating more perspectives about the country’s violent past into
its national narrative.
The unclear ends and the insuperable subjectivity of History education create
complications in evaluating its contribution to common goals such as economic development.
International donors for education confront challenges in measuring the effect of History
teaching on the countries they support. Although countries teach Mathematics and English in
fairly similar ways, they do not agree upon how to teach History. Each state centers its nation in
the teaching the past, and within each nation, disagreements abound over the accuracy of the
official national narrative. National sovereignty comes to the fore when one country assesses the
History curriculum of another country because they usually have differing perspectives on what
had happened in the past. The aid recipient country may reject the imposition of donors’
historical interpretations on its own History curriculum even though the same country may be
willing to accept assistance for improving its Science curriculum. As a result of this ambiguity
and these delicate tensions between donor and recipient, there has been little scrutiny of the
History curriculum in low-income countries. Notwithstanding these challenges, states across the
world have been tasked with providing education to its population.
Nationalized Education as an International Norm
Although the controversies of teaching History remain, nationalized education has
rapidly spread throughout the world. Mass education has become a universal responsibility of the
state during the past two centuries. 88 Rather than limiting education to the elite, mass
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nationalized education provides all school-age citizens the opportunity to gain access to the same
state-sponsored knowledge. From its beginnings, mass education has been tied to the nation: its
birth coincided with the emergence of the principles of nation-building and state sovereignty.89
By the twentieth century, almost every single western European state had adopted statesponsored education. Because of sweeping societal trends including the waning influence of the
Catholic Church, the European state grew in its strength and influence upon its population.90
Religious movements that undermined the cultural and political hegemony of the Catholic
Church during the Reformation and Counter-Reformation contributed to legitimizing the state as
“the guardian of the nation.”91 Virtually all contemporary states have included their hopes to
achieve universal education in their constitutions and national laws.92 At the World Education
Forum in 2000, 164 governments pledged to achieve Education For All by 2015 with the support
of the United Nations and the World Bank.93
Several theories seek to explain the advent and expansion of mass education, but all of
them relate education to national cohesion in one way or another. Functional theories argue that
the political elite have employed education to solve the problems of industrial society. Education
maintains elite dominance and social order through the homogenization and cooptation of
divisive elements that arose with industrialization. 94 However, this societal-level explanation
does not explain the worldwide trends toward state-sponsored mass education. John Meyer and
others argue that, in recent years, states have expanded mass education to conform to the world
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model of the nation-state. Existing Western European states serve as examples of the nation-state
prototype. Postcolonial states’ desire to conform to this model accords with their commitment to
“development.” States often implicitly define the process of development as following the path
of industrialized Western European states. In this endeavor to reach nation-state status, states use
mass schooling as a “mechanism for creating symbolic links between individuals and nationstates.” 95 State-sponsored mass education presupposes that all members of the state share a
common national culture.96 History education plays a vital role in achieving the goal of national
integration to turn this assumption into a reality.
Few empirical studies exist on this relationship between History education and identity
salience. It is difficult to measure the saliency of a continually changing, context-specific identity
of an individual, and it is even more challenging task to measure the general saliency of identity
among all members of a population. Yet, it is possible to draw inferences from case studies of
countries that have rapidly expanded nationalized education. Where national identity has arisen
and become more salient over a period of time, one can reach some conclusions about the impact
of nationalized History education on identity.
Four Experiences in Nation-Building
Four case studies illustrate the importance of nationalized education in nation-building.
France, Japan, and Prussia began as ethnically diverse populations and employed education to
unite under strong national identities. The sub-Saharan African state of Tanzania also has an
ethnically heterogeneous population, but its education system has been praised for its successful
promotion of national identity and peaceful interethnic relations. In each case, History education
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functioned as a part of the educational apparatus to enhance the saliency of national identity over
other identities.
The cases of France and Japan demonstrate how schools introduce, build, and reinforce
national identity through History teaching, while the case of Prussia illustrates how a shift in
state control changed the boundaries of national identity. Andy Green argues that these countries
used mass schooling as a vehicle for intensive state formation in response to internal or external
threats to stability. 97 Formerly a collection of massively fragmented ethnolinguistic groups,
France embarked upon the path to nationhood through education during the French Revolution.
To unify the citizens under its rule, the revolutionary government established the Paris Normal
School, which trained teachers to teach a new France-centered curriculum including French
History.98 During the post-revolutionary period, Napoleon made more headway in controlling
schools by centralizing the educational bureaucracy and placing it under state control to support
the state’s nation-building goals.99
Though often described as ethnically homogeneous, Japan historically began as an
ethnically diverse population of people who spoke different dialects and strongly identified with
their region of inhabitance. Samurai warriors maintained their own fiefdoms called kuni, the
Japanese word for “nation.” After Japan opened itself up to western influence in the 1840s, some
regional groups formed new coalitions in order to protect themselves against the common threat
of foreign invasion and domination. 100 These internal and external changes led to the Meiji
Restoration of 1868, during which the Japanese government used education to integrate formerly
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separate feudal units.101 Youth throughout the nation spent a required four years in education to
learn the basic principles of national morality based upon the teachings of their “Imperial
Ancestors.”102 Through expanding nationalized education, the governments of France and Japan
fostered the development of well-defined national identities and reduced their citizens’
allegiances to previously strong ethnic groupings.
Prussia had also been “a state without a nation.”103 In 1716, the Prussian state required
compulsory education for all children, and became the first to do so, as part of its endeavor to
unite its citizens into a nation.104 A century later, the Prussians tasted the bitterness of military
defeat and occupation by Napoleon, and the influential Prussian Junker class emerged from the
end of the Napoleonic wars with strong nationalistic sentiments against the French. Yearning to
reestablish Prussian power and influence, the Junkers employed compulsory education to
transform Prussian society from one based on serfdom and royal absolutism to one centered on
the reformed Junker state. 105 Nazi Germany’s dissolution of the Prussian state and nation
elucidates the impermanent nature of each national identity. The continual reinforcement of
national identity through education is necessary for ensuring the identity’s survival. Since new
states and even new regimes can alter the boundaries of the nation, state-sponsored nationalized
education can replace previous national identities with new ones. The postcolonial African state
also struggles to merge its ethnically diverse population into one nation.
Although the notion of the nation-state in Europe is associated with war, Tanzania is
often hailed as a model state for preventing ethnic conflict while forging national unity. Tanzania
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has enjoyed exceptional successes in welding together over one hundred different ethnicities into
one Tanzanian identity. First Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere lent strong support to providing
nationalized education for the unification of the country. 106 Nyerere harshly criticized the
instrumentalization of colonial education to meet the objectives of the colonial state. He enacted
widespread educational reforms to promote economic development and to foster the social goals
of cooperation for the common good of the country.
Tanzanian education also aimed to promote modernization, self-reliance, and Tanzanian
socialism. Kiswahili was aggressively promoted as the language of instruction in primary
schools.107 In the Arusha Declaration, Nyerere declared his government’s commitment to ujamaa
socialism. Under his leadership, the regime implemented free and compulsory primary education
for citizens to understand and create ujamaa (“extended family” in Kiswahili). In addition to
inculcating a strong sense of Pan-African identity, the national curriculum placed an emphasis
upon common Tanzanian history, culture, and values. 108 Students had studied British and
European history under colonial rule, but after Tanzania gained independence, they began to
study the History of Africa based on information gathered by researchers at domestic educational
institutions. Scholars often juxtapose Tanzania to neighboring Kenya: both countries are
ethnically diverse, East African, and former British colonies. Despite their similarities, some
research suggests that interethnic cooperation is greater in Tanzania than in Kenya because
Tanzanian people identify with the nation over the ethnic group. 109 A comparison of an
ethnically diverse region in Tanzania and a similarly ethnically heterogeneous region in Kenya
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found that region in Tanzania experienced fewer inequalities along ethnic lines in the provision
of public goods.110 Education is a key explanatory factor. While students in Tanzania developed
a strong sense of Tanzanian and African identity, Kenyan students focused on local geography
and History until their fifth year of primary school.111
The Manipulation of Identity through History Education
As a component of its duty to provide mass education, the state creates and promotes a
national narrative. Because of the subjective nature of history, political elite can manipulate
History education to enhance certain identities over others. States use History education to
antagonize their citizens against other nations. The retelling of the past can contrast dramatically
on different sides of the border. After independence, India and Pakistan created their own
History curricula that provided conflicting explanations for the partition of India.112 Pakistan’s
Islamcentric national History textbooks paint India as a Hindu state that perpetually threatens
Pakistan’s existence.113 North Korea and South Korea define themselves against each other in
their national History curricula while at the same time promoting an ethnocultural nationalism
and Korean unity.114
In this process of standardizing the definition of the nation, state-sponsored education
also suppresses the voices of marginalized people living within state borders. Nazi Germany
employed education as a tool to indoctrinate students in the necessity of securing the future of
the Aryan race. History textbooks represented Jews as the “antithesis of everything German”
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even though Jews had lived alongside other Germans for centuries. 115 In nineteenth century
America, Indian boarding schools sought to “kill the Indian…and save the man”: they had
operated to wipe out students’ ethnic identities and to replace them with mainstream American
identities.116 One fixed definition of national identity could smother other forms of identity.
On the other hand, History teaching has the power to promote reconciliation, tolerance,
and inclusiveness by incorporating new representations of former enemies. 117 Nationalized
education has helped heal countries suffering from the legacy of ethnic conflict. By changing the
national narrative, states created new, more inclusive definitions of nation. Witness the role of
History education in Northern Ireland, where teachers teach History with an enquiry-based
approach and encourage pupils to learn History from various different perspectives. 118 The
government of Northern Ireland has attempted to address the roots of ethnic conflict in Northern
Ireland through the incorporation of Irish history within the context of Europe and the United
Kingdom.119
Subnational and supranational perspectives can also dominate History education. History
teaching can center on an ethnicity’s past and encourage ethnic solidarity. For example, the state
of Arizona banned classes designed for students of a certain ethnicity on the grounds that such
classes promote divisiveness among its ethnically diverse population.120 The state has threatened
to impose a penalty on Tucson schools if the district does not end its Mexican-American studies
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classes.121 Proponents of the new law argue that teaching United States History from a MexicanAmerican perspective increases Mexican-American resentment toward the dominant CaucasianAmericans. Some countries also include History teaching from supranational regional
perspectives. The Council of Europe recognizes the importance of History teaching as a method
of bridging people of different countries together with a common regional narrative and has
recommended the promotion of European awareness in secondary schools.122
As globalization increasingly reveals the interconnectedness of people throughout the
world, some support History teaching for global citizenship. According to these advocates of
global citizenship, schools should raise students’ awareness of world issues and expose them to
international perspectives on past and current events. Proponents of John Dewey’s progressivist
educational philosophy assert that schools should provide education for global citizenship in
order for students to gain the knowledge and skills needed for civic participation at the local,
national, and global level.123 A strong advocate for human-centered education, Daisaku Ikeda
emphasizes that education must encourage students to recognize how deeply their lives are
intertwined with those of people throughout the world.124
History teaching is thus a powerful tool for creating and reinforcing ethnic, national,
regional, and global identities. Since identity guides political behavior, the privileging of certain
identities over others in History education has important behavioral ramifications. A case study
of Uganda reveals how education and History teaching have been deliberately manipulated by
various actors in pursuit of different objectives.
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CHAPTER III: HISTORY OF EDUCATION IN UGANDA

Te okono obur bong’ luputu
“The pumpkin in the old homestead must not be uprooted”
-

Acholi proverb125

This well-known saying admonishes the Acholi people to protect their cultural identity
from destruction by foreign influences. The pumpkin symbolizes the wealth of traditions that
root the Acholi to their past. Through proverbs such as this one, Acholi elders traditionally
passed down their knowledge and wisdom to the youth during daily family gatherings around the
evening fire. Although some children in present-day Uganda still learn about the history of their
clan and ethnic group during the fireside stories of their elders, more and more children attend
schools in the nationalized education system and study the History of Uganda as a nation. A
century ago, this was not the case. During the pre-colonial (before 1894), colonial (1894-1962),
and postcolonial (after 1962) periods of their history, the inhabitants of the region now
recognized as Uganda acquired education through different means. Different actors during each
time period have wielded three distinct forms of education – traditional, missionary, and statesponsored nationalized education – to contribute to the formation of Ugandans’ identities. In
contemporary Uganda, all three forms of education continue, but the influence of each one over
the general population has fluctuated over time and varies by region. All three types of education
have played a significant role in shaping the changing perceptions among the people of Uganda
about their own ethnic, national, regional, and global identity.
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The Roots of Traditional Education: The Precolonial Period
In precolonial Uganda, traditional education 126 socialized children to develop strong
ethnic and clan identities. Prior to the arrival of Christian missionaries and European explorers,
indigenous ethnic groups emerged as people formed social and political organizations with
varying degrees of centralization. Some Ugandan ethnic groups 127 , such as the Baganda and
Banyoro, ruled through hierarchical kingdoms, whereas others, such as the Langi and
Karimajong, governed themselves through decentralized clan networks and cycling age-set
systems. Composed of families descending from a common ancestor, the clan acted as the main
social unit under the umbrella of the ethnic group. In general, under both highly centralized and
decentralized organizations, older members of the ethnic groups educated the younger members.
The family, as a part of the clan and the overarching ethnic group, played a central role in the
traditional education of children. 128 In some respects, traditional education was a very fluid
concept. The indigenous people of Uganda traditionally taught their youth using methods that
greatly differed from the classroom instructional methods imported by the Europeans. Unlike
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missionary and state-sponsored mass education, traditional education was not restricted to the
walls of the classroom. Teaching was inherent in the way people lived their lives. Students were
educated through everyday experiences as they learned observing the behavior and listening to
the words of the more experienced members of the society. All adult members of the society,
especially the parents and elders, were responsible for teaching the children about how to live as
and appreciate their roles as members of the family, clan, and ethnic group.
Oral poetry and literature played a significant role in preserving the history of the clan
and ethnic group. No uniform History curriculum guided the teachers: historical information
varied across and within different ethnic groups. Each storyteller did not follow a predetermined
script when giving an oral history, and storytelling was a two-way interaction between the
teacher and the student. In the evening, the elders sat around a fire with the children and passed
on their moral and cultural knowledge through the telling of riddles, proverbs, and songs to
inculcate the values and norms of the clan and ethnic group. The elders told stories that explain
the history of their ethnic group and encouraged the children to develop confidence in their
ethnic identity. For example, the Acholi people take pride in their many different traditional
dances, and all Acholi children once learned how to dance for various occasions such as
courtship and burial. These cultural traditions, practiced by previous generations, contribute to
reinforcing youth’s ethnic identity and pride, and some Acholi today blame mass education for
preventing children from learning about these traditions. 129 Among the first generations of
Acholi to attend a missionary school, Ugandan writer Okot p’Bitek describes how colonial
European education erased indigenous identity:
“Overdressed in his dark suit he walks out of the University
gate, out into the world, materially comfortable, but
culturally castrated, dead. A lost victim of the school
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system, he cannot dance the dance or play the music of
his own people…”130
Traditional education also created gender identities. Children learned different skills
according to their gender: females learned how to cook and clean, while males learned how to
herd cattle and to farm. Mothers and aunts groomed girls for marriage and wifehood. Fathers and
uncles taught boys how to grow up to become strong men, who can protect and provide for the
needs of the family. Specialists with particular knowledge and skills, such as expertise on
performing religious ceremonies or administering law, transferred their knowledge to select
members of the younger generation. In the Buganda kingdom, for example, young pages from
certain families trained to become chiefs at the Buganda king’s palace.131 The age-set system
also created wider social cohesion among local communities sharing a common ethnic identity;
boys from different communities participated in a series of challenging rites that cemented their
relationship as age-mates to each other. 132 Expected to reciprocally exhibit loyalty and
hospitality, the age-mates supported the survival and continuation of the greater ethnic group
even after they returned to their remote homes.
These ethnic groupings also underwent continual transformations through time as some
ethnic groups conquered and assimilated others. Maintaining a coherent group identity was
crucial for each ethnic group in its struggle for survival and expansion. The Buganda kingdom
was particularly successful in attacking and defeating neighboring ethnic groups and extended
the Buganda identity to the newly conquered peoples, replacing their previous identities.133 Thus,
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during the precolonial period, traditional education, as the dominant form of education, enhanced
the ethnic and clan identity of the people.
The Advent of Missionary Education in the Precolonial Period
Christian missionary education began to change these ethnic identities by introducing
European and Christian values to the indigenous people. Despite the existence of the wellestablished institutions of traditional education, and over a decade before the imposition of
British protectorate status, some indigenous leaders encouraged the introduction of European
missionary education into their society in order to pursue their objectives of ensuring the
continued existence and even expansion of their ethnic group.
Much of the history of the establishment of missionary education revolves around the
history of the Buganda kingdom, which itself was a colonizing empire that conquered and
subordinated other ethnic groups to its rule. Before his kingdom gained British protectorate
status, the Buganda king, or Kabaka, had welcomed Muslim Arab traders, Protestant
missionaries, and Catholic missionaries into the kingdom. By building relationships with the
powerful foreign powers associated with each group, the Kabaka protected his kingdom against
foreign invasion. These religious groups spread their ideology and influence through the
education of the indigenous population, beginning with the Baganda, the people of the Buganda
kingdom. The first of the foreigners to initiate a relationship with the Buganda kingdom, Arab
and Swahili traders from Zanzibar were encouraged to stay near the palace of Kabaka Muteesa
I.134 In 1868, the Kabaka converted to Islam, and from this privileged position, the Arabs taught
the Baganda about their religion and how to read the Qur’an.135
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Seeking to connect himself to the powerful governments of Britain and France and to
overpower neighboring ethnic groups with European knowledge and technology, Muteesa I later
invited European missionary teachers to his kingdom.136 Indeed, even though they were invited
to serve the Kabaka’s aims, Christian missionaries arrived and introduced European-style
schooling with the principal aim of evangelism. 137 In 1877, the Protestant teachers of the
Christian Missionary Society arrived from Britain, and in 1879, the White Fathers Society
composed of French Roman Catholics were also welcomed into the kingdom.138 The Protestant
and Catholic missionaries instructed the Buganda chiefs and servants primarily on Christianity,
reading, writing, arithmetic, and agriculture, and they taught history through a religious and
European lens. Believing that they were leading a civilizing mission to convert the Baganda to
Christianity, the Christian missionaries educated them to change their beliefs and thus the nature
of their identities. Tensions rose among the Muslims, Catholics, and Protestants as they
competed to gain political influence over the Baganda. 139 The Buganda kings also became
increasingly suspicious of the missionaries’ activities because the newly-converted Baganda
refused to follow some of the kings’ orders on religious grounds.140
Sensing the identity-changing effects of the foreigners’ teachings on the Buganda people,
Kabaka Mwanga, who succeeded Muteesa I, had over thirty Baganda converts killed and
planned to remove the British, French, and Arab teachers from his kingdom’s domain. 141
However, the Christian and Muslim foreign teachers and their followers deposed Mwanga and
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placed his brother into kabakaship. 142 Even after this collective effort, Christian and Muslim
Baganda began to fight each other for influence, and the Christians triumphed over the Muslims
in 1888 and returned Kabaka Mwanga to his throne.143 Soon afterward, war broke out between
the Protestants and the Catholics, and with British military intervention, the Protestants, and thus
the British, gained the upper hand in the Buganda kingdom.144 Just as the Buganda kingdom had
acted to gain more power in its own region, the British, pursuing their national interests,
intervened to prevent the French and Germans from expanding their influence in Africa. Despite
their defeat, the Muslims and Catholics continued to establish their own schools throughout the
region. Missionary education introduced schisms into the previously more unified Buganda
identity, but with the victory of the British Protestants, a different kind of Buganda identity
developed that included aspects of British and Christian identity. Although the missionaries
sought to fulfill their own proselytizing objective, the Baganda used them and their education to
elevate their status in relation to their neighbors. In so doing, they deliberately changed the
nature of their own identity.
Missionary Teachers as Colonial Partners: Changing Buganda Identity
Protestant missionary teachers had laid the groundwork in the Buganda kingdom for
British colonialism by Christianizing and westernizing Buganda identity. The establishment of
the Uganda Protectorate in 1894 raised the Buganda Kingdom’s standing relative to other ethnic
groups in the area. The first to sign a treaty with the British to gain protectorate status, the
Buganda kingdom assisted the British in conquering the other ethnic groups in the region as the
British expanded its control by signing more treaties with the leaders of other ethnic groups.145
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The name of the protectorate was derived from the Kiswahili name of Buganda, “Uganda,”
which the British mistook as the kingdom’s name.146 This choice of name clearly demonstrates
the central role of the Buganda kingdom in the eyes of the protectorate government. Through
Protestant missionary education, Buganda identity had become more imbued with British and
Christian values. The Baganda were thus able to use the power and influence associated with the
“white man” to bolster the prestige of their ethnic identity even after the British assumed control
of their territory.
The Buganda identity began to be tied to “civilization” as the British praised and favored
them for their receptiveness to Christianity and westernization. 147 Many British colonizers
believed that the presence of Buganda would civilize other ethnic groups.148 Offering to act as
colonial administrators, the Buganda imposed their culture onto other ethnic groups from their
positions of British-backed power. Buganda chiefs, who were sent to rule over other ethnic
groups, insisted that all of the people speak Luganda, the language of the Baganda, and regarded
the traditional clothing of the local people as barbarian. 149 Although some Baganda adopted
Christianity and chose to wear western clothing, they managed to maintain a cohesive Buganda
identity.
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Parliament and government with ministries of justice, health, and education, thereby changing
the structure of their political institution.152
Christian missionary schooling spread quickly as the demand for European education
grew among the indigenous people, who perceived the benefits associated with obtaining a
European education. These benefits included the enhanced economic and social status that was
accorded to westernized, literate Africans. People of other indigenous ethnicities saw how the
Baganda had profited from these advantages because educated Baganda gained access to clerical
positions in the protectorate government. Kenyan writer Ngugi wa Thiong’o explains the elitism
and power associated with literacy in Africa: “the privileging of the written over the oral had
roots in the relationship of power in society and history…The dominant social forces had
become identified with the civilized and the written.” 153 Africans increasingly perceived
missionary education as more valuable than traditional education, and the missionaries trained
many of the indigenous people to propagate Christianity and missionary schooling throughout
various parts of the protectorate.
Centralized but Separate: Education in the Later Colonial Period
The protectorate government initially did not support the missionaries’ education of
indigenous people because the colonial officials had feared that the Africans would use the
knowledge they gain through schooling to stage an uprising against the British. But, as it
expanded its administration and economic activities, the colonial regime reconsidered this policy.
The government decided to use education as a tool to teach the indigenous population the
necessary skills for working in the lower echelons of the colonial bureaucracy and enterprises.
Trained Africans could replace the comparatively more expensive Indians, who the British had
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brought as railroad laborers from their colony in India. In 1925, the government established the
Department of Education in order to coordinate and provide financial support to the churches’
educational activities while increasing state control over education.154 The government supported
the missionaries’ work while seeking to change the focus of education provision: it encouraged
primary schools to emphasize technical training over literacy education and set up its own
technical schools in order to serve its economic interests.155 Even though it identified closely
with the British Protestant missionaries and encouraged the promotion of Christian values, the
Uganda Protectorate government later endeavored to reduce religious groups’ influence on
education in order to avoid the resurgence of interreligious conflict. Nevertheless, by 1960, out
of Uganda’s 28 secondary schools, only 8 were run by the government, while 20 were run by
missionaries.156 The missionaries remained the foremost providers of European education to the
indigenous people.
As a part of their divide-and-rule policy, the British implemented policies to increase the
influence of local ethnic groups on missionary schooling. Encouraging the indigenous people to
remain as fragmented ethnic groups, the colonial regime implemented education policies to
prevent the Africans from identifying and collaborating with each other to oust the colonizers.
Thus, the regime’s educational policy deliberately discouraged the formation of a unified
national identity among the indigenous people. The government also supported missionary
education to alter aspects of ethnic identities in order to bring them in line with British and
Christian values. Schools taught British History but did not teach African History, thus placing a
further hindrance to the development of a collective memory among the African ethnic groups.
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An essential part of the British civilizing mission, education helped justify the subordination of
the local people to British colonial rule. In 1925, the British colonies developed a blueprint for
education in British colonial Africa called Education policy in British tropical Africa.157 The
memorandum affirmed the British’s policy preference of adapting education to local traditions in
order to “strengthen the feeling of responsibility to the tribal community” while at the same time
stressing the importance of Christian religious and moral instruction.158 In addition, the Thomas
Education Committee of 1940 reviewed Uganda’s education system and made recommendations
which eventually led to the adoption of policies that increased local control of education. A
system of Board of Governors was established in order to promote local involvement in school
administration, and local governments, which were usually controlled by the leaders of
indigenous ethnic groups, were given the responsibility of financing primary education.159
This support for the enhancement of ethnic identity aligns with the colonial regime’s
other policies that heightened hostilities among the different ethnic groups of Uganda. The
colonial regime divided Uganda up into administrative districts, each representing the dominant
ethnic group of the region that would act as the local government and extension of colonial rule.
The district encompassing the Buganda kingdom’s geographical domain of rule became the
instrument of colonial administration, while the other districts were brought under colonial
control through the Baganda chiefs.160 Because of their reputation as skilled warriors, members
of ethnic groups in the northern region, such as the Acholi and Langi, were recruited for
positions in the police and army. 161 Through this blatant division of labor, the British also
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increased differentiation between ethnic groups in the North and South and encouraged
ethnicities in each region to identify against the other region. In addition to providing the
Baganda people with the most access to European education, the colonial policy of indirect rule
boosted the status of Baganda chiefs and generated anti-Buganda resentment from other ethnic
groups.
Although few colonial records describe indigenous people’s perceptions about their
identities, some describe the Baganda as extremely prideful of their own identity and resistant to
the idea of a Ugandan nation beyond Buganda.162 Despite the emphasis of educational policy on
local identity, Kabaka Daudi Cwa warned against the “foreignization” of the Buganda people
and the loss of Buganda culture and traditions through European education.163 African students at
the state-run Makerere University mobilized to demand the independence of Uganda but worked
to influence the progression towards decolonization through university associations tied to their
ethnic origins.164 Overall, people retained strong identification with their ethnic group since the
vast majority of the people continued to learn history at the family and clan level, and even those
who attended the missionary and government schools remained loyal to their ethnic roots
because of the British policy of divide-and-rule. This trend was reversed with independence.
Education after Independence: National in Fact and Focus
Although there was opposition to British rule, Uganda did not gain its independence
through a nation-wide movement that unified the indigenous people against their common
oppressor. After signing the Atlantic Charter, which enshrined all peoples’ right to selfdetermination, and facing increasing pressure from the United States to decolonize their imperial
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possessions, the British prepared its colonies, including Uganda, for independence.165 During this
process of planned decolonization, the protectorate government provided education to Ugandans
in order to teach them the skills and knowledge deemed necessary to eventually govern the new
nation. Some scholars argue that the British acted to ensure their neocolonial influence by
placing European-educated indigenous people, who would remain loyal to the British, into
positions of political power in the newly independent regime. 166 Cambridge-educated Kabaka
Muteesa II became the first President of Uganda, and Milton Obote I, who attended the
government-run Makerere University of Uganda, became the first Prime Minister.167
After gaining independence in 1962, the new Ugandan government pursued the
Africanization and the nationalization of school curriculum, especially the subject of History, in
order to promote Ugandan and African identity. Traditional education continued to reinforce
ethnic identity at the family level, and missionary education continued to promote the
Christianization and westernization of local identities, but the post-colonial state sought to bring
Ugandan and African identity to the fore by revamping the Anglocentric curriculum. Under the
colonial regime, students had studied the History of Britain and its empire; the history of the
Ugandan and African people were ignored.168 Moreover, with the destruction of oral traditions to
tie them to their own past and the long steeping in History told from the colonizer’s perspective,
Ugandans’ understanding of themselves and their place in the world arguably had been
skewed.169 Schooling was racially divided: Europeans, Asians, and Africans attended separate
institutions, and each group was also split into different religions. Among the Indian population,
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the Hindus, Muslim Ismailis, Sikhs, and Roman Catholic Goanese had each created their own
schools.170
The new Ugandan government took numerous steps in order to promote the integration of
its ethnically diverse population and to revive the people’s pride in African identity. In 1963, the
government appointed the Castle Education Commission to review the education system and to
provide policy recommendations to meet the objectives of the new government. 171 The
Commission created a new structure of education, which has largely remained the same until
today, and it nationalized the school curriculum for the first time. 172 In addition, the 1963
Education Act placed all grant-aided schools under the control of the government to loosen the
grip of racial and religious groups on education and to pave the way for greater unity under an
African identity.173 Once under government control, the schools were prohibited from barring
children, who were not of the same race or religion, from local areas to attend their school.
The government also devised a new national curriculum in 1964 in order to increase the
people’s confidence in their Ugandan national identity and African regional identity. 174 In
conjunction with new policies to Africanize the staffing of schools and to reduce the influence of
expatriate teachers, the syllabi for the curriculum was slowly revised to in order to center it on
African identity and history.175 Under President Milton Obote, Uganda also underwent a period
of expansion of access to education from 1962 to 1970.176 New primary schools were built, and
existing schools were enlarged.177 From 1962 to 1970, the number of secondary schools rose by
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260 percent. 178 The Ugandan government established the National Curriculum Development
Center in 1973 to carry out curriculum reform in order to change the way students were taught in
schools throughout the entire nation. 179 While these measures were taken to encourage the
formation of national identity, the nationalization and Africanization of education did not impact
large portions of the population: most Ugandans still did not gain access to nationalized
education and faced challenges in attending school in the midst of post-independence instability.
One way to measure the relative strength of national identity relative to ethnic identity is
to examine the occurrences of ethnic conflict in different periods of post-colonial Uganda.
Although several different Ugandans have thus far served as president, only Obote, Amin, and
Museveni were able to remain in the position for at least a year. A comparison of interethnic and
international relations in Uganda during the Obote (1966-1971, 1980-1985) and Amin (19711979) years and under current President Museveni’s regime (1986-present) illustrates how the
Museveni regime’s strong commitment to national unity along with the promotion of universal
education has enhanced Ugandans’ national identity and reduced the occurrence of ethnic
conflict in the country.
Obote and Amin Regimes: Little Education and Ethnic Conflict
A continual struggle for control of the government between the non-Bantu speaking north
and the Bantu-speaking south – a legacy of divide-and-rule under the colonial regime – underlies
much of Uganda’s violent political history.180 Ethnic divisions were greatly pronounced under
the rule of Milton Obote and Idi Amin. The instability and conflict of these years hindered the
expansion of education throughout Uganda.
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Milton Obote sought to gloss over ethnic differences by significantly weakening
traditional political institutions. A struggle for power between the Baganda, the former agents of
British indirect rule, and all of the other ethnic groups of Uganda characterized postindependence politics. In 1966, then-Prime Minister Obote, a Langi from the North, deposed
Kabaka Muteesa II, a Muganda, to become the second President of Uganda. In order to shrink
the power of the traditional leaders of ethnic groups, Obote removed the autonomous powers of
all kingdoms, reduced the Kabaka’s powers to a ceremonial position, and expanded the powers
of the central government.181 While his government Africanized the school curricula and sought
to remove ethnicity from politics, Obote’s regime forged disunity by favoring the Acholi and
Langi, generating resentment from other ethnic groups. The army, led by Idi Amin, a Kakwa
from the Northwest, eventually staged a successful coup against Obote.
Amin’s rule accentuated ethnic differences with exclusive policies that patently favored
some ethnic groups over others. In contrast with highly school-educated Obote, Amin had only
attended an Islamic school for four years.182 Education was not a priority under his rule. Amin’s
regime elevated the status of certain ethnic groups over others and institutionalized the unequal
treatment of Ugandan citizens of different ethnicities. Amin once stated, “In any country there
must be people who have to die. They are the sacrifices any nation has to make to achieve law
and order.”183 These words encapsulate Amin’s infamous method of dealing with hostile ethnic
groups: eradication. Under Amin, the state apparatus was employed to crush ethnic groups who
posed a threat to his rule. Since he considered the Acholi and Langi, who were favored under
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Obote’s rule, as menaces to his power, he purged the army of Acholi and Langi military
personnel and enlisted more Kakwa and Nubians.184
Uganda’s international relations with neighboring East African countries also soured
under Amin. Although he adopted some nationalist and Pan-African rhetoric, his lack of steeping
in nationalized and Africanized education was clear. Amin attempted to annex the Kagera region
of Tanzania, claiming it as a part of Uganda. After he ordered his battalions to invade Tanzania,
then-President of Tanzania Nyerere responded by driving Amin’s forces out and eventually
ousting him in 1979 with the Uganda National Liberation Army, a rebel group composed of proObote Ugandans. Amin’s enhancement of ethnic tensions and instigation of insurgency by
marginalized groups eventually led to his demise.
Meanwhile, school attendance rates dipped even lower, and the Ugandan government
gradually lost its ability to fund education because Britain and the United States cut off their aid
to Amin’s regime.185 After several interim leaders, elections brought former president Obote to
power again. However, his rule again provoked armed resistance, and an Acholi from the North
called Tito Okello deposed him. In 1986, the National Resistance Army (NRA), composed of
southerners, succeeded in waging a guerilla war to oust Okello and declared its leader Yoweri
Museveni the new president of Uganda. As warfare raged between government forces and rebel
groups in each of these conflicts, many schools in Uganda were destroyed, and insecurity
hindered the continuation of education.
Under the Umbrella of the NRM: Education for National Unity
Nationalized education in conjunction with other nation-building policies under current
President Museveni has helped build a Ugandan national identity among the population. In
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contrast to the Obote and Amin regimes, the current government has taken significant steps to
increase access to education with the enhancement of national identity as a central objective.
After attending primary and secondary school in colonial western Uganda, Museveni obtained
his Bachelor of Arts from the University of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania. A Muyankole from the
Ankole ethnic group of southwest Uganda, Museveni came to power supported by a narrow
social base of mostly Baganda and Banyankole, who made up the bulk of the National
Resistance Movement (NRM)186. He advocated for a policy of broad-basedness to encourage the
inclusion of all Ugandans, regardless of ethnicity, ideology, or previous political affiliation.187
The Ten Point Program of the NRM, the defining document of Museveni’s regime, includes the
consolidation of national unity through the elimination of all forms of sectarianism.188 The NRM
claimed that it sought to forge unity among Ugandans of different ethnicities.
Even before it took control of the government, the National Resistance Army (NRA)
devoted significant efforts to the political education of the local people as a means of spreading
its political ideology. 189 While waging guerilla warfare against Obote and later Okello and
gaining control of more Ugandan territory, the NRA brought chaka-mchaka education to the
local people in tandem with organizing them into Resistance Councils. Designed to politically
educate local populations to function as a part of the NRA, chaka-mchaka education included
self-defense training and political education. The NRA thus taught their version of the history of
Uganda.190 Until 1998, the government required chacka-mchaka for students graduating from
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Senior 6 of secondary school. 191 Although criticized by opponents of the NRM as a tool of
political indoctrination, chaka-mchaka education helped raise national consciousness and
facilitate the formation of a coalition among various ethnic groups in southern Uganda against
northerner rule. Currently, elements of this political education have been incorporated into
primary schools’ Social Studies curriculum. In the fourth year of primary school, for instance,
the students learn about the leadership in the local government, and in the fifth year, they learn
about the government of Uganda. Education has remained a cornerstone of the NRM’s efforts for
national integration.
Museveni’s regime focuses on two primary goals in providing mass education: economic
growth and national unity. Both are emphasized, the former more than the latter, in the MoES’s
Education Sector Strategic Plan 2004-2015. The document explains the essential role of
education in “Uganda’s development as a proud nation, a strong government, and a vibrant
economy” and assumes that education will lead to poverty eradication, industrialization, and the
reduction of interethnic hostilities.192 Towards these ends, the Ugandan government, supported
by international donors, has made tremendous strides towards achieving universal primary and
secondary education. The government has taken responsibility for providing and administering a
standardized nationalized education for Ugandans throughout the country.
Trends in History of Education in Uganda
Throughout precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial Uganda, different actors had
deliberately used education to promote the construction of different identities. After
independence, state-sponsored nationalized education has gained greater influence over the
youth while the influence of community-based traditional education has waned. Chapter Four
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explains how History teaching in primary schools has cultivated national and regional identities,
which, as discussed in Chapter One, influences people’s political behavior. Nationalized
education has succeeded to an extent in uprooting the pumpkin of indigenous traditions and
planting new identities by gradually changing the way Ugandans perceive themselves in relation
to others.
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CHAPTER IV: HISTORY EDUCATION IN CONTEMPORARY UGANDA
The teaching of a nationalized History in Uganda has contributed to the formation of
national identity among the ethnically diverse people of Uganda. Nationalized History education
gradually changes people’s perspectives towards others within their nation and fostered
relatively more peaceful interethnic relations and international relations with East African
countries. However, this emphasis on schooling and greater national integration deepened the
decline of traditional culture and the marginalization of non-school attending populations.
Uganda’s History Curriculum: Fostering National and Regional Identity
Even though Uganda’s Ministry of Education and Sports emphasizes the development of
national unity in its objectives for education, History education in Uganda lacks a strong national
leaning. Unlike the nation-centered History curricula of countries such as the United States,
France, and Japan, the national History curriculum of Ugandan schools does not solely focus on
providing a national narrative. Among other objectives, the national curriculum of Uganda aims
to help students understand their world and the cultural heritage of the different people within the
nation and region (see Appendix D for the full list of objectives of History education in Uganda).
In alignment with these goals, primary school teachers teach their students the History of the
subnational local district and of the supranational region in addition to that of the nation. Since
most Ugandan students do not continue on to secondary school, this analysis focuses on the
content of the History curriculum in primary education.
In their fourth year of primary education, students in Uganda begin to study History as a
component of the Social Studies (SST) curriculum (see Appendix E for a syllabus of topic areas
covered in each year of SST). Integrating social, economic, and political issues, SST is an
interdisciplinary study of the people and their environment. Students commence, in Primary 4
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(P4), with the History of their district. The district is the highest administrative unit of local
governance and is no longer demarcated along ethnic lines as it had been during the colonial
period.193 Thus, teachers lecture on the History of the major ethnic groups living in the local
district instead of only teaching the History of a specific ethnic group. Nevertheless, the P4 SST
curriculum mostly focuses the current characteristics of the people, environment, and
government in the district. In the next three years of primary school, students devote each year to
studying the History of Uganda, East Africa, and Africa in that order.
The History of Uganda takes precedence in Primary 5 (P5), when students learn about the
nation of Uganda. 194 Almost two-thirds of the P5 SST syllabus is dedicated to History. P5
students study precolonial Uganda, the influence of foreign actors, the formation of the Ugandan
nation, the road to Uganda’s independence, and postcolonial Uganda. During their study of the
precolonial period, students learn about the origins of different ethnic groups in Uganda. The
SST curriculum specialist of the National Curriculum Development Center in Uganda explained
that SST encourages students of all different ethnicities to feel as if they are all Ugandan.195
Despite the prominence accorded to national unity in the curricular objectives, Ugandan schools
do not provide a glorious national narrative about the unification of the different ethnic groups
under one nation in a joint struggle against colonialism. Students are taught that the Ugandan
nation was a product of colonial rule. The History of how Uganda became a nation is
surprisingly Eurocentric: students examine how the British gradually took control of the territory
which constitutes contemporary Uganda by battling against and signing treaties with the leaders
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of indigenous kingdoms.196 Essentially, students learn that the British had created Uganda. Thus,
pupils’ understanding of Ugandan identity is closely linked to a colonial past. Nevertheless,
young Ugandans do not necessarily identify against the British. Teachers encourage students to
debate the benefits and costs of colonialism to the African people. Surprisingly, the curriculum
barely touches on the History of postcolonial Uganda beyond independence. Amin’s brutal rule
is virtually left untaught. Additionally, teachers do not detail current President Museveni’s rise to
power through guerilla warfare against Obote and Okello, but they highlight his role in
encouraging the revival of the East African Community.
The Primary 6 (P6) and Primary 7 (P7) SST curricula serve to provide the foundations for
two kinds of supranational identities: East African and African.197 In P6, students are taught the
history of East Africa, comprised of Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania. Pupils learn that East Africa
is the birthplace of humankind. They gain knowledge about the common past of the major ethnic
groups in the region: they study the ethnic groups’ origins, their migration to different parts of
East Africa, and their ways of life. They also learn about the common colonial experiences of the
three nations. People in Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania have very similar origins, but the
colonizers had split them up to create their own spheres of influence. Through agreements made
in Europe, Britain and Germany drew imaginary lines to divide East Africa into three colonies.
The Europeans created new states along these new lines, ignoring the existence of precolonial
organizations. Therefore, the P6 SST curriculum encourages students to identify with other
people in East Africa by teaching their shared past. Their final year of primary school expands
this conception of regional identity beyond East Africa.
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SST in P7 teaches the History of Africa. The study of African History mainly centers on
Africans’ common experiences under European colonialism. Although teachers briefly teach
students about the leaders of African nationalist movements, they spend a significant portion of
time teaching the History of South Africa. Students learn about the apartheid regime and the
struggles of Nelson Mandela against the racially segregated society. History teaching in P7 thus
reinforces a sense of Black African identity among Ugandan students.
History is compulsory for all students in Ordinary level during the first four years of
secondary school. Ordinary level students study the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth
century History of Uganda and East Africa. In line with the general objectives of education, the
objectives of History education for secondary school students include the promotion of
understanding and appreciating the value of national unity, patriotism, and the cultural heritage
of East Africa and Africa (see Appendix D for the full list of objectives for both Ordinary and
Advanced level). The themes of national and supranational collective histories introduced in
primary school continue to weave themselves throughout secondary school studies of History.
Primary school students in Uganda learn about History mainly from three different
geographical frameworks: Uganda, East Africa, and Africa. Three distinctive qualities of History
education in Uganda impact the nature of identity formation fostered by the nationalized
education system. First, the three identities reinforced by the curriculum are closely related to
each other. Chapter One had discussed how some identities are closely intertwined with other
identities. Although national and regional identities are distinct concepts, they can overlap in
certain cases. Regardless of their different ethnic identities, indigenous Ugandans all perceive
each other as Africans. Moreover, many ethnic groups straddle two or all three of the East
African nations. This notion of a shared African identity strengthens the ties among the people of
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Uganda and of the larger East Africa. Along the same lines of thinking, Ugandans identify with
other Africans on the continent. One interviewee explained that, to a Ugandan, having an African
identity means behaving in a friendly and non-discriminatory way toward other Africans.198 This
conception of a very inclusive national identity is significantly different from the limited national
identity of nation-states such as Japan. The History curriculum of Uganda in fact recognizes the
artificial nature of the boundaries created by the colonizers.
Second, because of its relatively inclusive nature, Uganda’s History curriculum does not
promote identification against a clear “Other.” Even if the “Other” may potentially be the
Western European nations that had colonized most of Africa, the relationship with the “Other” is
not hostile but often rooted in admiration. Instead of encouraging distancing from the “Other”,
nationalized education, by promoting economic development, seems to encourage Ugandans to
become more like the “Other.” Ugandan leaders have advocated for the modernization of
Uganda in order to follow Western countries’ trajectory of development. President Museveni has
declared that Uganda can industrialize by giving everyone an education.199 Just as the Europeaneducated Baganda became associated with civilization and prestige during the colonial period,
the lack of education and Westernization is now associated with backwardness and the barbarism.
Thus, nationalized education, with its strong European roots, encourages students to become
more like the European “Other” and to dissociate themselves from the uneducated “Other” in
Uganda. By providing a fairly Eurocentric narrative of Ugandan, East African, and African
History, the national History curriculum also perpetuates this general trend in education.
Third, the History teaching does not tie each identity to its own distinct set of values.
Ugandan, East African, and African identities carry different meanings to every Ugandan. The
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American identity taught in United States’ schools is linked to notions of individual freedom and
democracy. In contrast, aside from the experience of a common colonial past under the British
protectorate, the national identity of Ugandans does not exude a core set of fundamental values.
Neither does East African identity. The Pan-African identity conveys the importance of unity and
was built on a communal African struggle against the oppression of Europeans. The History
curriculum alludes to these values through the discussion of the South African revolution against
apartheid, but the ideas of Pan-Africanism seem to have hollowed out since all formerly
colonized African nations have gained independence. As a further note, out of the different levels
of identification explored in Chapter One, global citizenship education by far plays the least
significant role in the nationalized History curriculum of Uganda. This is similar to the curricula
of the vast majority of nationalized education systems throughout the world. Even though the
identities promoted by the Ugandan government are less clearly defined and less exclusive
compared to other national and regional identities, these identities are promoted over the notions
of a common bond shared by all human beings.
The History curriculum of Uganda will continue to undergo change. Every five to seven
years, the Ugandan government revises the curriculum in order to meet the needs of the
population. In 2011, the Ministry of Education and Sports, with financial support from the World
Bank, began the process of procuring and advising publishers to produce new textbooks for all
subjects.200 Although much of the historical information for the curriculum is based upon British
written accounts, Ugandan university scholars have also carried out field research to develop
Ugandan narratives of their past. 201 The National Curriculum Development Centre of the
Ministry of Education and Sports has endeavored to make the curriculum-building process more
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inclusive: teachers from different regions of Uganda participate in curriculum building.202 As
progress is made towards a new curriculum, a History curriculum that emphasizes Ugandan, East
African, and African identity has become more and more accessible to people throughout
Uganda. Even though Uganda’s national History curriculum is not solely centered on the nation,
it still provides the basis for national identity, albeit one without the exuberant pride and glory
associated with many other national identities. Referring back to Chapter One, the construction
of a sense of group identity depends upon a belief in the common past, present, and future of the
group members. As Chapter Two detailed, historical knowledge serves as the foundation for
collective identity, and schools in the nationalized education system fulfill the function of
socializing students in order to add and enhance the saliency of their national and supranational
identities. Shaping the identities of youth is especially significant in Uganda, where 77 percent of
the population is below the age of 30.203
Trends of the Expansion of Nationalized History Education
Decline of Traditional Education and Oral History
The traditional education, missionary education, and nationalized education described in
Chapter Three all play influential roles in contemporary Uganda. In present day Uganda,
traditional education has not been completely displaced by European-style schooling. It
continues to thrive in isolated rural areas that have experienced less Western influence. People in
rural areas generally have less access to nationalized education than people in urban areas. While
66 percent of the rural population aged 10 years and above are literate, 86 percent of their
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counterparts in the urban population are literate.204 Even though most school-aged children today
in Uganda attend some school, they continue to obtain a traditional education from their families
when they return home.
Aiming to achieve Education For All and the UN Millennium Development Goals, the
Ugandan government has significantly expanded access to schooling in the past decade through
its implementation of Universal Primary Education (UPE) and Universal Secondary Education
(USE) (see Table 1 for current net enrollment rates). After the introduction of the UPE in 1997,
primary school enrollment rose from 2.3 million in 1996205 to 8.3 million in 2009.206 In the same
period, the net enrollment rate, or the ratio of the primary school-age population attending school,
nearly doubled, jumping from 57 percent207 to 108 percent.208 Nevertheless, the pupil retention
rates remain low: less than half of the pupils who had enrolled in Primary 3 continue on to
Primary 7, so many do not remain for all four years of SST.209 School enrollment rates decrease
as students reach higher levels of education, and only a small portion of the population completes
secondary school. Since the implementation of USE in 2007, the net enrollment rate for
secondary school education increased from 19 percent in 2006 to 24 percent in 2009.210 An even
smaller portion of the population – around 4 percent – attends tertiary institutions.211
Most young Ugandans are at least exposed to the historical information taught in SST at
the primary level of education. As a result of this rapid expansion, schools have gained a
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relatively stronger influence over the youth of Uganda. As more children go to school and obtain
more years of schooling, youth spend a larger amount of their time in school than at home. This
is especially true for boarding school students, who only return home for the holidays. More time
at school means less time acquiring the knowledge of one’s clan and ethnic group through
traditional education.
Table 1: Nationalized Education in Uganda
Stage of schooling
Years at stage Classes212
Pre-Primary School
Primary School

3 years
7 years

Secondary School
Ordinary Level
Secondary School
Advanced Level
University and other
tertiary institutions

4 years
2 years
Varies

nursery/kindergarten
Primary 1 (P1) until
Primary 6 (P7)
Senior 1 (S1) to Senior 4
(S4)
Senior 5 (S5) to Senior 6
(S6)
N/A

Net enrollment rate of
school-age population213
10% (2008)214
107.9% (2009)215
33% (2009)216
14% (2008) 217
4% (2009)218

Missionary education retains considerable influence over the Ugandan population. The
government controls the majority of primary and secondary schools – 76 percent and 50 percent
respectively – but most had been established by religious institutions, which continue to exercise
influence over school policies and support the proselytization of the students.219 Furthermore, the
government schools continue the educational practices introduced by the European-style
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schooling brought by the missionaries. Thus, even though teachers teach the History of Uganda,
East Africa, and Africa, instead of the History of Britain, they employ largely the same
instructional methods used by European missionary teachers in the colonial period.
The expansion of nationalized and Africanized education has also meant the expansion of
European-style schooling. As discussed in Chapter Three, while European education is placed in
a separate sphere from other aspects of one’s life, traditional education in Uganda is deeply
integrated into people’s lives. Consequently, the rising prevalence of European-style schooling
has fundamentally changed the nature of Ugandans’ ethnic and national identity. The increase in
prestige associated with obtaining a nationalized education has reduced the status of indigenous
means of education. For instance, the most school-educated ethnic group, the Baganda have
progressively lost touch with their traditional culture in the process of attending missionary and
government-controlled schools. In the precolonial and colonial period, leaders could dismiss
individuals who did not satisfactorily answer questions about the traditions and history of the
ethnic group. 220 Traditional knowledge was a prerequisite for claiming Buganda identity. In
contemporary Uganda, a Muganda gains the respect of other Baganda by attending school
instead of staying at home and learning from his/her elders. In order to revitalize Buganda
culture in the lives of the people and to reconnect them to the way their ancestors had lived, the
Buganda queen launched a camp for Baganda children to learn about the culture, traditions, and
morals of their ethnic group. Camp participants learn how to engage in the traditional activities
of the Buganda, such as preparing groundnut sauce and matooke (steamed plantain).221
Despite the increasing influence of state-sponsored mass education, traditional education
remains an important contributor to the identity formation of those who continue to return home
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and learn from their elders. One degree-holding Ugandan interviewee explained that traditional
education has had a larger impact on her life than her primary and secondary school education.
In the former, she learned about things that were useful and relevant to her life. In the latter, she
often learned impractical information and memorized large amounts of information taught in
class before examinations, only to forget what she learned soon after the exams.222 She claims
that she hardly remembers what she learned in primary and secondary school, but she has
internalized what her parents and elders taught her during the evening fireside stories in the
village. As her experiences demonstrate, the instructional methods employed by the teacher also
determine how well the students are socialized to adopt a certain identity. The Ugandan national
curriculum includes national and regional History, but, without effective reinforcement, the
information remains generally irrelevant and unimportant to the individual.
The quality of education in Uganda has not improved as rapidly as the increase in the
access to schooling. Young people face a number of impediments to internalizing the knowledge
they learn in school. The government distributes textbooks to schools to meet set student-totextbook ratios, but because of various obstacles preventing the efficient and fair distribution of
resources, the ratio is at times one book for every fifteen or more students.223 Even if students do
have access to textbooks, they are often out of date. The national curriculum is revised every five
to seven years, but most teachers do not immediately receive training or textbooks to assist them
in teaching the new syllabus.224 Furthermore, most secondary school students are overwhelmed
by the amount of content they must memorize. Ordinary level students take History along with as
many as 18 other subjects, depending upon the school. Only a few of the many challenges in
education in Uganda are discussed here, but each illuminates the obstacles standing between the
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student and teacher in the transmission of information. Even though all schools are expected to
teach the same national curriculum, students often do not learn the content of the History
curriculum well. Nevertheless, school-goers still experience a form of education radically
different from traditional education.
Regional Disparities: North versus South
Nationalized education has not spread equally throughout Uganda. Specifically, the North
has lower enrollment rates than the South. Some ethnic groups in particular have had extremely
low exposure to schooling, which has marginalized them from the rest of the nation. In the
Karamoja region of northeast Uganda, where the Karimojong people live, traditional education
remains the most influential form of education. 225 Tenaciously rejecting Christian missionary
activity and nationalized education, the people of the Karimojong ethnic group remain among
some of the least school-educated people in Uganda. While 89 percent of the Baganda and 70
percent of the Ugandan population is literate, only 13 percent of the Karimojong are literate.226
In addition, the net enrollment rate of the primary school-age population of Moroto district in the
Karamoja region is 35 percent, in contrast to the national enrollment rate of 108 percent. 227
While 24 percent of the nation’s secondary school age-population is enrolled in secondary school,
a scant 5 percent in Moroto are enrolled.228 These enormous gaps in educational attainment also
reflect the social distance between the Karimojong and other ethnic groups in Uganda. One
Karimojong interviewee expresses the extent of the marginalization of the Karimojong by other
Ugandans: “People in Uganda feel that Karamoja is not in Uganda.” This widespread belief is
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further confirmed by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics categorization of the Karimojong as “nonUgandan.” 229 Many Ugandans view the Karimojong as unwilling to embrace “development,”
especially because the Karimojong carry out cattle-raiding in order to sustain their pastoralist
livelihoods. Other Ugandans’ disassociation from the Karimojong also stems from perceiving the
Karimojong’s hostility to non-traditional education and lack of assimilation into the rest of
Ugandan society.
In the 1930s, the Karimojong elders had buried a pen to symbolize their defiance against
foreign education.230 Taking “the pen is mightier than the sword”231 to a literal level, the burial of
the pen demonstrated Karimojongs’ perception of European education as a threat to the survival
of their culture and identity. During a UNICEF-supported government campaign for education in
the Karamoja region, the pen was recently unearthed as a gesture emblematic of their acceptance
of nationalized education. Gradually, the school enrollment rates of Karimojong children have
risen as the provision of education has also been adjusted to fit the lifestyle of the Karimojong
people. The Alternative Basic Education for Karamoja program enables children to continue to
assist their families in pastoralist activities while attending classes taught by local teachers for a
few days a week under trees. The Karimojong who attend school have gained greater awareness
of their position as a member of the nation of Uganda. At school, they study the History of the
country and the region, whereas those who remain at home learn the history of their clan and
ethnic group from their parents and elders.
The distribution of education in Uganda has also been influenced by rebel activities in
certain regions of the country. Because of the destruction and instability in northern Uganda
229

UBOS, “2002,” 81.
Conan Businge, “Karimojong exhume pen to foster development,” New Vision, January 15, 2008,
http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/9/35/606778.
231
Edward Bulwer-Lytton, “Act II. Scene II,” in Richelieu; Or the Conspiracy: A Play in Five Acts (London:
Saunders and Otley, 1839).

230

Mino 84
caused by the devastating conflict between the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) rebel group and
the government, the North has generally had less access to education than the South. Since the
LRA abandoned northern Uganda in 2007, these regional differences have gradually narrowed,
and the government has carried out its commitment to the equal access to nationalized education
through UPE and USE. Nevertheless, clear regional inequalities in the levels of education
persist: 59 percent of northern Uganda is literate, while 80 percent of central Uganda, as part of
the South, is literate.232 The lack of education also has an impact upon poverty rates because
schools teach skills and knowledge necessary for employment in various fields. Because of war
and the reduced access to education, the North also ranks the lowest of all regions in most social
indicators. In 2005/2006, the North had the highest poverty rate at 61 percent when the national
poverty rate was 31 percent.233 The regional disparities in access to education along with gaps in
various social indicators deepen the North-South divide. Many northerners harbor resentment
toward the southerners because they have not reaped equal benefits as southerners from the
country’s economic prosperity and the improvement in the delivery of public services. Because
the economic and political elite are predominantly from western Uganda, Ugandans of other
ethnic groups also feel that there is a bias toward members of President Museveni’s ethnic group,
the Banyankole of western Uganda.
Despite the spread of education and the teaching of History centered on the nation and
the greater region, the North-South split remains fairly clear during elections.234 Although this
seems to indicate ethnic polarization, it actually demonstrates how Ugandans expect politicians
to serve the entire nation, rather than only a certain ethnic group. Despite its emphasis on
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national unity, Museveni’s political party, the National Resistance Movement (NRM), has not
adequately bridged the regional divide between the North and the South. The NRM fared badly
in the northern districts during the 1994 Constituent Assembly election. During the first national
presidential elections in 1996, Museveni won overall with 74 percent of the vote, but his
opponent Ssemwogerere won most of the districts in the North.235 In the 2001 general elections,
Museveni’s rival, Besigye, won in all of the northern districts but lost the national election.236
The NRM thus faces a large legitimacy deficit in the North because it had built its coalition
among the southerners during its rebellion against the northerner President Okello. These voting
patterns show that people in the North tend to vote against Museveni, but they do not necessarily
demonstrate that ethnic interests are driving the votes in northern Uganda. Rather, northerners
had voted against Museveni’s regime because they feel that it has failed to cater for the
improvement of the lives of people throughout the whole nation. The expansion of nationalized
education has not erased the memory of ethnic groups and ethnic identity. Instead, it has added
national identity to the complicated mix of an individual’s self-conception.
Ugandan Parliament: Highly Educated Leaders for a Poorly Educated Populace
The inconsistent spread of nationalized education throughout Uganda is reflected in
regional disparities in political representation at the national level. The requirements for political
participation are strongly linked to educational attainment in two major ways. First, the official
language of Uganda is English, so English fluency is required for working in the central
government, reading and writing government policy, and communicating with other Ugandans.
Without attending school, Ugandans encounter difficulties acquiring oral and written English
fluency. Second, Ugandans must complete a high level of education in order to serve in the
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central government. In order to become a Member of Parliament (MP), a Ugandan citizen must
have at least completed Advanced level, or upper secondary education (see section 80.1.c. of
Constitution). 237 But these qualifications are usually insufficient in reality: the majority of
current MPs are degree-holders. 238 Hence, highly educated individuals represent and make
critical decisions on governing a nation that has a 70 percent literacy rate – and not necessarily
English literacy. These two requirements reflect the greater value accorded to nationalized
education above other forms of education in Ugandan society.
Because of the educational requirements for central government positions, lower
educational attainment has hindered the political involvement of northerners at the national level.
Although each constituency239 is represented by an MP in Parliament, northerners do not have as
many positions in the central government as southern ethnic groups. Andrew Mwenda of The
Independent news magazine in Uganda reports that ethnic groups from the South hold a
disproportionate number of appointed positions in the government.240 Westerners, who make up
26 percent of the national population, and the Baganda, who make up 17 percent, hold 44 percent
and 30 percent of all top public appointments respectively.241 Northerners are almost completely
absent from top public offices.242 Less political participation at the national level means less of a
voice in important decision-making processes that impact the entire nation. Thus, the lack of
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education has helped perpetuate the marginalization of ethnic groups like the Karimojong in
government policy.
All the MPs have developed their identifications as Ugandan nationals and can appreciate
the collective interests of Uganda as a whole. History education played an important role in their
identity formation: they have gained the foundation for their own national identities while
studying national and regional History in primary and secondary school. The saliency of national
Ugandan identity relative to their ethnic identity is reflected in their voting behavior. According
to Kauzya, a Ugandan expert on managing ethnic diversity in Parliament, MPs do not vote along
ethnic lines but along party lines.243 The parties are also not formed along ethnic lines. Although
some political parties may be more popular with some ethnic groups over others, none of them
are formed on a platform advocating for the interests of a specific ethnic group. Kauzya reasons
that although there are around 48 ethnic groups in Uganda, there are 112 districts, each of which
is represented by an MP, so the districts are not drawn clearly along ethnic lines. This political
structure obstructs MPs from voting to benefit their ethnic group. Even MPs of the same
ethnicity who belong to different parties often vote against each other.
Moreover, along with favoring school-educated over traditionally-educated individuals,
the 1995 Ugandan Constitution minimizes the role of the ethnic socio-political organizations,
such as the Buganda kingdom, in national politics. Traditional leaders within these organizations
cannot become members of Parliament (see section 80.2.c.). 244 Thus, they are effectively
removed from the political system, except as ordinary citizens and voters, even if their
sociopolitical organizations are allowed to continue to exist.
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Changing Perceptions about Ethnicity
The rise of national consciousness has not only affected the highly educated politicians at
the national level but also ordinary citizens throughout Uganda who have gained exposure to the
idea of the Ugandan nation through schooling. Although ethnicity remains highly salient among
the general population, people now additionally engage in political behavior that is guided by
national identity.245 Even if they act on behalf of their ethnic group and supposedly pursue the
interests of their ethnic group, people recognize that they must operate within a national
framework. National and regional identity has been added in addition to ethnic identity to
people’s self-conception. As the importance of national identity is enhanced through various
circumstances, citizens adopt nationalist rhetoric and operate within national rules. The discourse
of dissident groups such as the Lord’s Resistance Army has centered on gaining control of the
national apparatus as opposed to seceding to create a new nation. Even though people of Acholi
ethnicity make up most of its leadership, the LRA fought to take control of the Ugandan
government and have actually wreaked the most pain and destruction on the Acholi people.
Cultivating East African identity through the teaching of East African History in schools
has nurtured peaceful international relations and increased regional cooperation with members of
the East African Community (EAC). As discussed in Chapter One, the saliency of national
identity also influences the way that people decide to behave toward nonnationals. The strong
ties between Ugandan and East African identity facilitate the adoption of East African identity by
the people of Uganda. Although Rwandan and Burundian History is not yet taught in schools, the
National Curriculum Development Centre endeavors to include them into the SST curriculum.
Many of the Ugandan interviewees expressed their identification with the rest of East Africa
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despite Uganda’s geographical location in the heart of Africa. But these developments mask
Uganda’s hostile relations with neighboring countries excluded from the EAC (see Appendix B
for a map of the EAC and its neighboring states). Uganda’s predominantly rural population is
generally not well aware of their government’s foreign policy decisions and place a greater
priority on domestic issues in their voting decisions. For example, in a survey taken in 2010,
none of the respondents stated that international war was one of the most important problems
facing the country in the 2011 elections.246 However, like any other country, Uganda struggles
with many foreign affairs issues. Uganda has 5000 troops deployed in Somalia, and in 2010, its
capital was bombed allegedly by the Al Shabab terrorist group based in Somalia.247 Uganda and
Sudan had also fought proxy wars against each other by supporting rebellions within the other’s
territory and in the Democratic Republic of Congo.248 Largely ignoring neighboring Sudan and
the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda’s SST curriculum teaches students to see Uganda as
a part of East Africa, not Central Africa. What is left out of the curriculum is also left out of the
formation of collective identity. A History teaching only going as far as the end of colonization
leaves students in the dark about the importance of international relations to Uganda’s history as
an independent state.
With rising national consciousness and school enrollment rates, catering to ethnic
interests is becoming less acceptable to the general Ugandan population. This shift in perspective
is reflected in their responses to recent Afrobarometer surveys about elections.249 68 percent of
Ugandans polled in 2011 said that the ethnicity of the leader of a political party mattered “a little
246
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or not at all” in their support for a party.250 46 percent claimed that the leadership skills of a
presidential candidate were the most important factor in their vote while only 2 percent
responded that the candidate’s ethnic origin was the most important quality.251 They responded
in similar proportions in regards to their decisions about candidates for Members of
Parliament. 252 Furthermore, when asked to choose between identifying as Ugandan or by
ethnicity, 57 percent responded that they feel equally Ugandan and their ethnicity.253 National
identity has not submerged ethnic identity but rather, added itself to each individual’s realm of
possible identities. These trends indicate the relative lack of political saliency of ethnicity among
the general population when it comes to votes. J. C. Ssekamwa, an expert on the history of
education in Uganda, claims that nationalized education has helped raise national consciousness,
which has led to better relations among ethnic groups in Uganda.254 In comparison to the brutal
conflict and terror of the Obote and Amin years, Uganda has experienced a relatively peaceful
coexistence of different ethnic groups, especially after the departure of the LRA from northern
Uganda. Framing their past in terms of the nation and region in the History curriculum has
contributed to the development of a sense of national unity.
It is important to emphasize that nationalized education is but one factor, albeit a very
powerful one, in the nation-building process of Uganda. While the government expanded
nationalized education, technological innovations have increased contact and communications
among people of different ethnicities. People of different ethnic groups are more aware of each
other than they have ever been. The construction of infrastructure links distant regions together,
and the introduction of new, inexpensive technology such as cell phones facilitate
250
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communication among people of different ethnic groups throughout the country. These trends
have raised awareness about occurrences in other parts of the country and enabled more exposure
to nationally framed issues. Greater rural-to-urban migration has increased the ethnic diversity of
urban areas, and migrants from other regions learn to communicate to each other through
commonly spoken languages. Newspapers and radio programs communicate news about
national-level politics and disseminate government rhetoric for national economic development.
Religious institutions also support the idea of national identity. For example, the Anglicans in
Uganda are organized under the Church of Uganda, not the Church of Buganda or any other
specific ethnic group. Although 65 percent of Ugandans have regular access to information from
the radio, education remains an especially influential agent in transmitting the idea of the
nation.255 Virtually all of the current primary school-aged population attend some school, while
many do not have access to information from television256 or newspapers 257 and have never
traveled to the capital city.
Improving and expanding nationalized education remains among the most important
priorities for Ugandans. The largest portion of the respondents to the 2010 Afrobarometer survey
answered that education was the most important issue in the 2011 elections.258 Ugandans also
recognize that education greatly impacts their access to political and economic power. This case
study of Uganda has shed light on the theoretical concepts developed in the first two chapters
about the relationship between History education, identity, and behavior. Even though political
scientists tend to characterize sub-Saharan African politics as “tribal,” the Ugandan case study
demonstrates that this is not necessarily the case. A quiet revolution in identity is occurring as
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nationalized education systems provide the foundations for raising consciousness about a
national and regional identity through History teaching. Nationalized education, promoting
national and regional identity defined by the state, has significantly shifted the way that people
perceive themselves and the way that people behave towards each other in Uganda.
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CONCLUSION: EDUCATING FOR THE FUTURE
States promote national integration through the provision and support of nationalized
education. Teaching a national History provides a foundation for the development of national
identity and reduces the saliency of ethnic identity fostered by local forms of education. Changes
in identity lead to shifts in behavior. As schools homogenize people’s identities to join under the
banner of the nation, unity deepens within the nation while division widens between nations.
The history of History education in Uganda demonstrates how ethnic communities,
foreign missionaries, the colonial regime, and the independent Ugandan government deliberately
manipulated education and the History curricula in order to promote and shape identity tied to
different social groups. With the rise of nationalized education, traditional education has lost its
influence. As a result, indigenous culture and oral history have slowly eroded. Ethnic identity has
also experienced a similar decline. Scholars often focus on the “tribal” nature of African politics,
but the Uganda case study shows that this is a mischaracterization: with the expansion of
nationalized History education, more Ugandans have developed national identities and gradually
perceive each other as members of the same national community with strong ties to the greater
regional East African and African community.
Filling holes: Where this belongs in existing literature
This analysis of education in Uganda is one of a few case studies of History education in
sub-Saharan Africa. However, it is one of many on History education throughout the world.
Within this topic area, many scholars have examined the politics of History curriculum building
in specific countries. 259 Although those who study these phenomena implicitly assume that
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teaching any version of History has important societal ramifications, few have evaluated the
effect of teaching History upon the identity and political behavior of individuals. Furthermore, a
clear theory has not been developed to explain why History education makes an impact upon
identity and behavior. This thesis attempts to fill this theoretical and empirical gap: it has
developed a theory to explain the process of how History education impacts identity and how
identity guides political behavior, and it has presented a case study of a country in sub-Saharan
Africa – a region that has received significant amounts of aid for education but comparatively
less scrutiny on the content of their school History curricula.
Some research has been done on the role of nationalized education on national identity
formation in Africa, but this literature focuses on language policies and scarcely expands on the
impact of the History curriculum on identity. This case study also fits into the literature on
nation-building. Like other postcolonial societies, Ugandan national identity was fabricated by
the British instead of forged from within. This distinction makes nation-building in places like
Uganda very different from the experiences of other countries such as France. Nevertheless, this
study has found that education plays an important role in these very different contexts. Even
though conditional factors vary across countries, Uganda’s example can inform analyses of other
postcolonial experiences in education. Like Uganda, other sub-Saharan African states also face
challenges of significant regional disparities in access to education.260 Scholars should undertake
more case studies of History education in sub-Saharan Africa to deepen their understanding of
these powerful trends in identity.
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Leaving some gaps: Limitations of study
Although it makes unique contributions, this paper has several limitations and gaps. On
the whole, it is wanting of more empirical evidence. Specifically, there needs to be more
statistical information collected on shifts in identity before and after students begin schooling.
The logistics of conducting research on Uganda from the United States created obstacles to
gathering survey information from primary school students in Uganda. An analysis of the content
presented in the History textbooks promoted by the Ministry of Education and Sports would have
also helped to bolster this paper’s empirical evidence. Furthermore, because of the complexity of
determining causal relationships in general, the thesis did not measure the importance of History
education in relation to other socializing agents that affect identity. The shift in the political
behavior of Ugandans as a result of the addition of national identity was also loosely described.
Once again, behavior cannot be explained by a single factor, and since identity is conditional, it
is difficult to make definitive claims about changes in political behavior. More field research in
Uganda can address many of these limitations.
Questions for future research
This study raises questions for future research that are applicable to all countries. First,
how do the instructional methods used in teaching History affect identity? This thesis briefly
mentioned that the vast majority of schools in Uganda employ teaching methods used by
Christian missionaries in the colonial period, but it is not clear how a change in teaching methods
affects the identities and the understanding of historical information by students. One of the
interviewees had explained that she did not internalize school knowledge as well as the
traditional knowledge passed down from her elders during the fireside stories. Furthermore,
research can determine whether the way History is presented to the students influences the nature
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of their identity. For instance, does History presented as hard facts versus History presented as
interpretations of the past affect the nature of an identity? Does an enquiry-based approach to
History education encourage students to develop less rigid conceptions of national identity?
Second, what is the impact of History education on other salient subnational identities
other than ethnic identity? For instance, how does teaching the national narrative influence
religious and gender identities? Research focused on these other identities will shed light upon
how changes in behavior between religious groups and different genders occur when people are
taught History from a religious slant or gender-biased perspective.
Third, this case study raises many questions about the influence of people’s perceptions
of reality. Despite the constructed and temporary nature of ethnic, national, and regional identity,
why do these identities remain highly salient to most people across the globe? The study of
History education clearly shows how things that may have been imagined become real because
of the power of people’s beliefs.
Education, broadly speaking, is inherent through any human communication. Although
contemporary literature tends to concentrate on its role in economic growth, education inevitably
produces different impacts by reaching deep into populations and transforming the way that
people think, something that the most powerful weapons in the world cannot do. Because of its
profoundly significant effects upon the minds and identities of people, there should be more
critical analysis of education in general.
Implications of study: Educating the future
The findings of this thesis have some important policy implications. First, the nationbuilding or nation-dividing effects of the expansion of nationalized education have implications
for international aid for education. Education For All and the UN Millennium Development
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Goals affirm the international commitment to expanding access to education. History curricula
have not passed under much scrutiny. If, as this thesis suggests, education has a considerable
impact upon national identity formation, how does this fit in with international donors’
objectives? If the rise of national consciousness within countries is not part of their aims, the
international community must reevaluate their reasons for supporting state-sponsored education
in low-income countries.
Second, the Ugandan government must seriously take into consideration the relationship
between History teaching and identity while revising their History curriculum. It can investigate
how other states have developed inclusive national narratives. Education has been used in many
countries to heal the wounds of violent conflict. For post-conflict nations such as Uganda, it is
important to understand how previously antagonistic groups can create a national narrative
together in order to promote unity. Since past injustices are used as fuel for conflict, the History
curriculum is an especially important component of the reconciliation process. In 2006, Rwanda
lifted a post-genocide ban on teaching History and has engaged in the process of developing a
new collective memory including the voices of both genocide victims and perpetrators.261
Uganda’s History curricula do not cover its conflict-ridden post-independence history in
depth. Although studying the recent past can evoke painful memories, it is important for
Ugandan students to understand the experiences of people throughout the nation in order to learn
how to move beyond their horrific collective past. The National Curriculum Development Centre
should collect the oral histories of ethnic groups throughout the country in order to develop a
multi-faceted national History. Indigenous voices and the perspectives of marginalized groups
such as the Karimojong must be added to the official historical knowledge taught in schools in
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order to foster greater mutual understanding among students of different ethnicities. The
Ugandan government should also consider incorporating elements of traditional education into
teacher’s teaching methods. The instructional methods of traditional education can offer more
democratic means of teaching History because of its lack of centralization and uniformity.
Third, all countries can learn from the Ugandan case because virtually all – with the
exception of the United States, which has a decentralized education system – have nationallydirected education systems. The theoretical explorations of this thesis highlight the constructed
nature of ethnic, national, and regional identity and the processes that created each of these
identities. Ultimately, all human beings are citizens of the world, so designating the state as the
generator of the national narrative and privileging the national narrative over other
interpretations of the past are not fitting for building a future of global peaceful international
relations. The development of national identity has helped forge unity among nationals, but it
also has pitted people against each other at the global level. Education for global citizenship is
increasingly being discussed in the field of education and should be considered as a preferable
alternative for the future of the human family. A shift to human-centered education from nationcentered education, however, does not mean ignoring local identity and local frames of
understanding. Japanese educator and philosopher Tsunesaburo Makiguchi describes the
community as the site of learning to understand global citizenship: “The community, in short, is
the world in miniature. If we encourage children to observe directly the complex relations
between people and the land, between nature and society, they will grasp the realities of their
homes, their school, the town, village or city, and will be able to understand the wider world.”262
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Students can study local, national, regional, and international History to develop their
understanding of the global community at different levels.
People can thus maintain their ties to local communities while appreciating their
membership in a global community and understanding the perspectives of others. Global
citizenship education also entails a global narrative of the human past. As more young people in
sub-Saharan Africa attend higher levels of schooling, the lions, or those who had been previously
silenced at the international level, are learning how to speak and to tell their stories to the global
community. These trends will also have important implications in changing the way that people
in wealthy countries view formerly colonized countries such as Uganda. The hunter can no
longer bask in his glory when the lion learns to speak like the hunter. But the lion can also teach
the hunter to understand the language of the lions and to interpret the past from their viewpoint.
The youth of sub-Saharan Africa will rewrite the History curricula of their countries and help
reclaim African voice at the world stage to assist the human community in developing an
inclusive narrative of human history.
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Appendix A: Education For All Goals
Source: UNESCO, “Education for all,”
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/education/themes/leading-the-international-agenda/education-forall/efa-goals/.
Goal 1: Expanding and improving comprehensive early childhood care and education, especially
for the most vulnerable and disadvantaged children.
Goal 2: Ensuring that by 2015 all children, particularly girls, children in difficult circumstances
and those belonging to ethnic minorities, have access to, and complete, free and compulsory
primary education of good quality.
Goal 3: Ensuring that the learning needs of all young people and adults are met through
equitable access to appropriate learning and life-skills programmes.
Goal 4: Achieving a 50 per cent improvement in levels of adult literacy by 2015, especially for
women, and equitable access to basic and continuing education for all adults.
Goal 5: Eliminating gender disparities in primary and secondary education by 2005, and
achieving gender equality in education by 2015, with a focus on ensuring girls’ full and equal
access to and achievement in basic education of good quality.
Goal 6: Improving all aspects of the quality of education and ensuring excellence of all so that
recognized and measurable learning outcomes are achieved by all, especially in literacy,
numeracy and essential life skills.
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Appendix B: Map of East African Community
Source: “An East African Federation: Big ambitions, big question-marks,” The Economist,
September 3, 2009, http://www.economist.com/node/14376512?story_id=E1_TQPSGVTN.
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Appendix C: Map of Uganda with Major Ethnic Groups
Source: Reliefweb, “Ethnographic Uganda,” http://reliefweb.int/node/19286.
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Appendix D: Curricular Objectives for Social Studies and History Education in Uganda
I. Objectives for Social Studies - Primary 4 to 7 (Source: SST Curriculum Specialist)
1. To help learners to understand forces that have shaped their society.
2. To understand the social and physical environment factors that shape the world in which
pupils live.
3. To foster an awareness of the cultural and physical rich heritage of their country and region.
4. To develop an appreciation of the different cultural identities of the people of Uganda.
5. To develop an understanding of the relationships among institutions in their complex society.
6. To develop an understanding of the relationship among the people, natural resources and the
quality of life of people lead.
7. To develop awareness of injustices and hypocrisies in society and the necessary safeguards to
resist them.
8. To understand and appreciate the rule of law.
9. To develop ability to read and interpret sources of information: from textbooks, charts, tables,
and graphic materials.
10. To develop skills of forming generations and hypothesis from collected data.
II. Objectives of History - Senior 1 to 4 (Source: History Curriculum Specialist)
1. To promote understanding and appreciation of the value of national Unity, patriotism and
cultural heritage in East Africa and Africa in general.
2. To help learners develop the ability to weigh information and make judgments on historical
events.
3. To help learners develop and practice skills of gathering information and express historical
ideas in a coherent and logical manner.
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4. To broaden the learners understanding of the social, political and economic developments in
different regions of Africa.
5. To promote scientific, technical, cultural knowledge, skills and attitudes needed to promote
development in Uganda.
6. To inculcate a sense of service, duty and leadership for participation in civic, social and
national affairs through group activities in Educational institutions and the community.
7. To instill moral, ethical and spiritual values in the individual to develop self discipline,
integrity, tolerance and sense of leadership.
8. To eradicate illiteracy and to equip the individual with basic skills and knowledge of history to
exploit the environment for development.
9. To contribute to the building of an integrated, self-sustaining and independent national
economy.
10. To lay a foundation for further studies.
III. Objectives of History education - Senior 5 to 6 (Source: History Curriculum Specialist)
1. To broaden the learners understanding of the political, social and economic development of
African history from the earliest times to present.
2. To stimulate thought and discussion by use of historical case studies.
3. To help students develop ability to relate historical events to the present situation.
4. To prepare learners for career professional growth as lawyers, teachers, community
development officers etc.
5. To prepare learners for further studies as undergraduate students, diploma courses among
others.
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6. To impart and promote a sense of self-discipline, ethical and spiritual values, personal
responsibility and initiatives.
7. To encourage historical research and use of a wide variety of source of historical materials.
8. To enable the individual to acquire and develop knowledge and understanding of emerging
needs of social and the economy of the world.
9. To instill and promote the national unity and an understanding of social and civic
responsibilities.
10. To understand and appreciate the cultural heritage of Uganda and rest of the world.
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Appendix E: Syllabi for Social Studies (Primary 4 to Primary 7)
Source: P4 SST Teacher, telephone interview with author, March 18, 2011.
I. Primary 4 - District
1st term: 1) geography of district 2) physical features in district
2nd term: 1) vegetation of district 2) people of district
3rd term: 1) leadership in district (different positions in local government) 2) how to meet
people’s needs in the district
II. Primary 5 - Uganda
1st term: 1) location of Uganda 2) physical features of Uganda 3) climate of Uganda 4)
vegetation of Uganda
2nd term: 1) people of precolonial Uganda 2) foreign influence in Uganda 3) how Uganda
became a nation (before independence)
3rd term: 1) the road to independence 2) Uganda as an independent country 3) government of
Uganda 4) people, tribes, and distribution, and their relationship to economy, planning, and
development
III. Primary 6 – East Africa
1st term: 1) location and physical features of East Africa (Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania) 2)
vegetation 3) climate of East Africa
2nd term: 1) people of East Africa 2) population change and distribution in E. Africa 3) foreign
influence in East Africa
3rd term: 1) establishment of colonial rule in East Africa 2) development of social services in
East Africa
IV. Primary 7 - Africa

Mino 107
1st term: 1) location and physical features of Africa 2) natural vegetation of Africa 3) climate of
Africa
2nd term: 1) people of Africa 2) foreign influence on African continent 3) post-independence
Africa
3rd term: 1) neocolonialism 2) African economic development (mining, agriculture)
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